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Re: Please kill preshared key.
The current PSK methods in IKEv1 lead to some horrible, insecure hacks
in real
implementations/deployments.
I know of at least one VPN/Road-Warrior implementation where the server
uses
PSK to authenticate itself to a client--but it uses the SAME PSK for
every
member of a "group", where groups are very large. This means that
anyone in
the group can pretend to be a server to any other member of the group.
This wouldn't happen in a self-signed PK-style pre-share. The
client adds the PK self-signed pre-share to their "trusted" list, and
only the real server (possessor of the private key) can convince a
client
of its authenticity.
If symmetric PSKs are kept, it had better be possible to do it right,
and
rather hard to do it wrong.
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