Re: Suggestion for SOI wrt PFS

[Jan Vilhuber <vilhuber@cisco.com>]

On Thu, 28 Mar 2002, Bill Sommerfeld wrote:

> > The ideal situation would be that the peers negotiate an IKE SA (with DH)
> > and one or more IPsec SAs (not using DH). After a specified timeout (the
> > forward secrecy interval), the peers forget SKEYSEED_d, and the next phase 2
> > exchange would have to contain a DH. This DH would be used to generate the
> > new SKEYSEED_d for subsequent exchanges.
>
> So, why not just start a new phase 1 at this point?
>

Then you'd have to reauthenticate, which you may not want to (public
key operation and all). At least that's the only difference I can
see. This is somewhat lighter weight than a full phase 1.

[ I haven't thought this proposal through yet, so I'm not coming down
on one side or the other ;) ]

jan
 --
Jan Vilhuber                                            vilhuber@cisco.com
Cisco Systems, San Jose                                     (408) 527-0847