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Re: addresses and IKEv2



At 11:05 AM -0700 5/17/02, Alex Alten wrote:
>At 10:42 PM 5/14/2002 -0400, Charlie_Kaufman@notesdev.ibm.com wrote:
>>This posting points out the tip of a very large iceberg. I think I
>>understand some of the issues (but I'm not confident); some seem
>>unsolvable; and some raise questions about the design goals of IPsec.
>>Attempts to improve things for some scenarios (e.g. Mobile IP) may make
>>things worse in others (e.g. Address Translation Gateways).
>
>Hello Charlie,
>
>You raise some excellent points as usual.
>
>I have privately thought for a long time that IPsec's dependence on an
>IP address to determine an SA to be a fundamental flaw in its design.
>To be effective IPsec needs a global address space, in which each host is
>uniquely identified, like the Internet was prior to the introduction of
>NATs, etc.  To make this work a way to dynamically map an Internet address,
>including duplicate private non-routable addresses, to a global unique IPSec
>address/identifier needs to be made available.  Each host can then query
>this database to resolve an IP address to a secure IPsec address/identifier.
>Cryptography is then used to assure that the IPsec address/identifier is
>indeed valid.  In this way both MobileIP and NAT can be supported as-is,
>because they operate on an insecure non-unique IP address, while IPsec uses
>the parallel universe of a secure unique IPsec address/identifier.
>
>However this approach does mean that IPsec can no longer be treated as just
>a secure protocol, or set of protocols if you include key management. It
>must be part of a security system, which includes this address mapping
>facility.
>
>Regards,
>
>- Alex

Alex,

I assume you have read the new ESP ID from last fall, as well as the 
new AH ID from this spring, and have followed the WG discussions of 
why the SA can be determined by examining just the SPI 9without 
referebce to the destination address), for unicast traffic.  Given 
that context, I'm not sure I understand your comments above.  Could 
you clarify?

Thanks,

Steve