RE: ipsec to secure rsvp

["Hannes Tschofenig" <Hannes.Tschofenig@mchp.siemens.de>]

hi mike!

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Thomas [mailto:mat@cisco.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 10:47 PM
> To: S. Felix Wu
> Cc: Hannes Tschofenig; kumar_amara@yahoo.com; dong_wei@tsinghua.com;
> IPsec; Security_Area_Advisory_Group
> Subject: Re: ipsec to secure rsvp
>
>
> S. Felix Wu writes:
>  > Therefore, (according to my old/dusty memory), Fred Baker's proposal
>  > to secure RSVP is based on a key table and key ID to allow the next
>  > hop trusted RSVP router to authenticate (HMAC fashion) the message
>  > without prior seesion-key exchange.
>
>    Right. There are two competing goals going on with
>    RSVP in this respect: router alert as a discovery
>    mechanism, and security desires which need to know
>    the how to key the next hop integrity object. I
>    don't really see how you reconcile that unless you
>    have group keys on your integrity objects which
>    makes me a little queasy.
i fully agree with you.
if you want to use protection based on symmetric cryptography then you first
must learn the identity of the node to whom you want to authenticate to.
(and the keys need to be in place).

with public key cryptography things are somewhat different. but from a
pratical perspective it does not provide the necessary performance. i guess
you can agree with me on this issue.


>
> 	    Mike

ciao
hannes