[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: SOI QUESTIONS: 2.3 Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)
On Wednesday 19 June 2002 01:54, Michael Richardson wrote:
>>
>> Theodore> 2.3.A.) Does SOI need to natively support "legacy
>> authentication systems"?
>
> No. cf. Bellovin Enrollment suggestions.
I don't find that suggestion practical enough to justify following it
now. The TODAY's reality is - non-PK auth systems are wide-spread and
are NOT going away. Not to support it natively simply complicates both
the protocol and the implementations.
And see below.
>> Theodore> 2.3.B.) Does SOI need to natively support some kind of
>> "shared secret" scheme?
>
> Not anymore.
Absolutely yes - "shared secret" is a-must.
> I believe that it was necessary in IKEv1 because there was no other
> useful patent free authentication system.
This was not just a patent issue!! Practically all the remote access
is based on some kind of non-PK approach.
Technically it is simpler to support non-PK natively, than to have TWO
interoperable protocols - one to retrieve the "credentials" and the
other one to actually use them (and then to worry to scramble those
retrieved credentials - lest somebody else "borrows" 'em later on)...
I understand "PK purists" - but in no way sympathize with their
position.
> We should do RSA as common protocol.
You mean "common algorithm", for the protocol cannot care less with
what crypto function the bit-sequence is signed. I'm against limiting
the algorithms to RSA-only, or even to PK-only, for the above reasons.
> We MUST define the ASCII format of the raw RSA keys, and mandate
> that they be loadable to the trusted store.
What if there is no trusted store? Look outside your concept box.
> Supporting things like pushing the policy down SHOULD be done.
Yeah, but is this IKE job?
--
Regards,
Uri-David
-=-=-<>-=-=-
<Disclaimer>