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Re: SOI QUESTIONS: 2.3 Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)
Excerpt of message (sent 20 June 2002) by Michael Richardson:
> Tylor> Many customers have deployed with pre-shared key authentication
> Tylor> ... will
> Tylor> these customers roll to IKEv2 if this authentication is not
> Tylor> supported?
> Tylor> What is their migration path?
>
> They migrate from distributing opaque blobs of hex digits that must be
> kept private to distributing opaque blobs of base64 digits that do not
> benefit from staying private, but it doesn't hurt them either.
>
> Can they tell the difference? The length is a bit longer.
A LOT longer. Long enough that -- unlike preshared keys -- you cannot
enter them manually.
> Tylor> If pre-shared key authentication is not supported, is this WG
> Tylor> going to
> Tylor> define a minimal set of how PKI is to be used with VPNs? How
> Tylor> keys/certs
>
> PK, yes.
>
> PKI, no. It is a PKIX problem.
>
> Everyone please repeat: PK does not require I to be useful.
True. But PK, even if all you ever use is selfsigned certs, still
needs a lot more near-incomprehensible concepts than preshared keys
do.
paul