Re: SOI QUESTIONS: 2.6 Formal proofs of security

[Jan Vilhuber <vilhuber@cisco.com>]

I would like to see a good analysis of the protocol done. That's
valuable.

'Proofs' don't convince me personally, and could conceivably mislead
the uninitiated. As Andrew pointed out, a proof finds only the
problems you're looking for. Maybe I'm just not enough of a
cryptographer or academic to be convinced of the value of the proofs
in security... I'd rather see a protocol analysis.

jan


On Thu, 20 Jun 2002, Theodore Ts'o wrote:

>
> Please discuss and answer this question.....
>
> 2.6 Formal proofs of security
>
> 2.6.)  Does SOI need to provide a formal proof of security?  (Is this
> a "must have" or a "nice to have"?  What are we willing to trade-off
> for having a formal proof of security?)
>
> Implications from the Scenarios:
>
> [none]
>

 --
Jan Vilhuber                                            vilhuber@cisco.com
Cisco Systems, San Jose                                     (408) 527-0847

http://www.eff.org/cafe