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RE: draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-ctr-00.txt



Michael Richardson wrote

> Anyone who *needs* AES-CTR mode, likely needs it because they have >1Gb/s
> links they want to secure. As such, I think that they have the bandwidth
> not
> to care.
> 
	>>> There is another application area that can benefit from CTR
mode. CTR doesn't do error extension. If you are working in a noisy
environment, have an application that can tolerate errors (but still don't
want a bit error to multiply), need confidentiality but can do without
authentication (e.g., you assure through other means that the plaintext is
inaccessible), CTR would be an appropriate choice. (Yes I know this violates
a MUST in the current draft, but that MUST leaves the developer without a
mode appropriate for use in noisy environments.)