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Re: draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-ctr-00.txt



In message <2575327B6755D211A0E100805F9FF9540E3455B4@ndhmex02.ndhm.gsc.gte.com>
, "Waterhouse, Richard" writes:
>Michael Richardson wrote
>
>> Anyone who *needs* AES-CTR mode, likely needs it because they have >1Gb/s
>> links they want to secure. As such, I think that they have the bandwidth
>> not
>> to care.
>> 
>	>>> There is another application area that can benefit from CTR
>mode. CTR doesn't do error extension. If you are working in a noisy
>environment, have an application that can tolerate errors (but still don't
>want a bit error to multiply), need confidentiality but can do without
>authentication (e.g., you assure through other means that the plaintext is
>inaccessible), CTR would be an appropriate choice. (Yes I know this violates
>a MUST in the current draft, but that MUST leaves the developer without a
>mode appropriate for use in noisy environments.)
>
>
The proper solution in that sort of environment is forward error 
correction.

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
		http://www.wilyhacker.com ("Firewalls" book)