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Re: Last ditch proposal for crypto suites
>>>>> "Henry" == Henry Spencer <henry@spsystems.net> writes:
Henry> On Thu, 29 Aug 2002, Dan Harkins wrote:
>> > Almost no one > in their right mind would really mean that Phase
>> 1 be protected with > DES and Phase 2 be protected with
>> TripleDES...
>>
>> ...We're talking about two different proposals (whether it's
>> suites or a la carte). One to protect the IKE traffic and another
>> to protect the bulk data. Those two traffic flows are quite
>> different and their security needs are different as well.
Henry> Yes, but under what circumstances would that particular
Henry> combination make sense? If 3DES is fast enough to be used for
Henry> bulk data, it is fast enough to be used for IKE traffic.
Henry> Given that IKE traffic is such a tiny fraction of the normal
Henry> traffic flow, there is just no sense in not using the best
Henry> crypto algorithm you've got to protect it.
I agree. The ability to specify separately what transforms you want
in phase 1 vs. phase 2 was always just a useless piece of extraneous
complexity in IKE V1. When we implemented our IKE management (a few
jobs ago) we didn't allow for this; the phase 1 transforms were the
same as the phase 2 transforms. Henry's argument is a good one, and
simplification of management is always valuable -- especially in
security systems.
paul