Re: draft-ietf-ipsec-pki-profile-01.txt

["Housley, Russ" <rhousley@rsasecurity.com>]

Brian:

Ref: section 3.3.11.3

>If trust anchors can be self-signed, what is wrong with
>pointing this out?  IMHO it makes the example clearer,
>as I'm pointing out that CA3 may actually NOT be
>self-signed.

The document says:

    Imagine that an implementation has previously received and cached the
    peer certificate chain R->CA1->CA2->EE. If during a subsequent
    exchange this implementation sends a CERTREQ containing the Subject
    Name in certificate R, this implementation is requesting that the
    peer send at least 3 certificates: CA1, CA2, and EE. On the other
    hand, if this implementation also sends a CERTREQ containing the Sub-
    ject Name of CA2, the implementation is providing a hint that only 1
    certificate needs to be sent: EE.

This is fine.  For some reason, I misread it, and thought that in the first 
case the certificate for R was being transmitted.  Upon rereading it, I see 
otherwise.  My objections dealt with the transmission of the certificate for R.

Sorry for the confusion,
   Russ