Re: speaking of keys

["The Purple Streak, Hilarie Orman" <ho@alum.mit.edu>]

You only get about an additional 16 bits of computational security for those
500 extra bits in the modulus size.

Also, the Diffie-Hellman group is a single basket holding all past
session keys.  Just because it is strong enough for one paranoid
usage doesn't account for the risk of having all past keys revealed.
You need a very healthy entropy margin to account for that.

Hilarie

On Fri, 6 Dec 2002 at 15:48:52 -0500 Stephen Kent discoursed:

> but why go all the way to 1536? Isn't there an 
> intermediate group size that would be reasonable for those who insist 
> on more than 1024, say something i the 1200 bit range?