Re: Confirm decision on identity handling.

[Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>]

Eric Rescorla writes:
 > Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
 > 
 > > Eric Rescorla writes:
 > >  > Paul Hoffman / VPNC <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> writes:
 > >  > 
 > >  > > At 8:08 AM -0700 5/15/03, Eric Rescorla wrote:
 > >  > > >Hmm... I see your point. I was speculating that this would mean
 > >  > > >that you didn't much care what was in the certificate.
 > >  > > 
 > >  > > You could have a security policy that ignored the identity in the cert
 > >  > > ("allow an SA with these restrictions to anyone who has a cert from
 > >  > > XYZRoot"), or one that was identity-based ("let chris@example.com make
 > >  > > an SA").
 > >  > But you would presumably want to have some restrictions
 > >  > on the IP addresses they were allowed to front for, right?
 > > 
 > > Why? Are you thinking of this only in terms of
 > > tunnels?
 > No.
 > 
 > Many of the same considerations apply for machine to machine SAs.

Well, I don't see it. The desire to restrict or
permit based on header classification seems
completely orthogonal to the policy decision of
what constitutes "authenticated enough". Why
should a policy of "*@foo.com" have to be further
qualified with "from 1.2.3.0/24" as well? You
might want to do that, but then again you might
not. The former may be perfectly adequate
securitywise.

		Mike