Re: Confirm decision on identity handling.

[Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca>]

>>>>> "VPNC" == VPNC  <Paul> writes:
    VPNC> At 3:01 PM -0400 5/20/03, Michael Richardson wrote:
    >> What I do hear is that the VPN has to work for two parties who have
    >> picked random CAs, and can't control what goes into the
    >> certificate. That sure sounds like "rwo random parties" to me.

    VPNC> We hear differently. No one creating a VPN (as compared to 
    VPNC> opportunistic encryption) can pick random CAs. For VPNs, there is a 
    VPNC> shared trusted CA.

  So, why is there a problem with telling the CA what needs to go into the
certificate?

]       ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine.           |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
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