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RE: Editorial: Use of MAY in draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-algorithms

> Me too.  With a statement that keys weaker than a certain 
> level (say, 128 bits although 96 is probably enough) SHOULD 
> NOT be used, I can live with DES being demoted to a SHOULD NOT.
> Still, I think that DES fits better with the definition of 
> MAY: "One vendor may choose to include the item because a 
> particular marketplace requires it or because the vendor 
> feels that it enhances the product while another vendor may 
> omit the same item."

We need to write requirements that have a reasonable lifetime;
keep in mind how long the MUST for DES survived.  DES is already
embarrassingly weak, and will only get weaker.

In the algorithms draft, I'd like to see:
	- SHOULD NOT use keys shorter than 128 bits
The latter is about key length, not effective strength of the
cipher against best known attack.

David L. Black, Senior Technologist
EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754