Re: IKEv2 SA rekeying - naming an initial SA

[Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>]

At 22:55 -0500 8/19/03, Nicolas Williams wrote:
>On Tue, Aug 19, 2003 at 08:25:23PM -0700, Nicolas Williams wrote:
>>  On Tue, Aug 19, 2003 at 04:31:36PM -0400, Stephen Kent wrote:
>>  > IPsec has no anonymous mode, because access control is an essential
>>  > feature of IPsec, unlike SSL.  So, no arguments based on the latter
>>  > paragraph of your message are likely to be appropriate in this
>>  > context.
>>
>>  One would never want to use anonymous IPsec with any application *other*
>>  than applications which bind authentication at higher layers to IPsec
>>  SAs.
>...
>
>I'd also like to point out that if we allow non-kg EAPs then we might as
>well allow anonymous IKEv2 :) :)
>
>And if we allow IKEv2 w/ non-kg EAPs (with loud warnings) because we
>think that others will implement the same regardless of whether it is a
>MUST NOT, then we ought to allow anon IKEv2 for the same reason (and
>also with loud warnings).
>
>And note that anon IPsec with GSS-API CCM channel bindings to the same
>is quite strong[*], compared to IPsec w/ non-kg EAPs.  The former is not
>subject to MITMs or spoofing, the latter is.
>
>[*]  As strong as the authentication and integrity protection services
>      of the underlying GSS-API mechanism.
>
>Cheers,
>
>Nico
>--

what part of "no" do you find puzzling :-)

Steve