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dam-l SEEKING ENDORSEMENTS! Letter to WB on SSP
Dear Friends
Below is a letter to the World Bank drafted by Paul Wolvekamp of Both Ends
in the Netherlands together with IRN and Lori Udall and with input from the
NBA. If you would like to endorse the letter please send me your name and
affiliation (if you cannot endorse on behalf of an organization please give
an affiliation (eg university or company) for information purposes). We
intend to send the letter at the start of next week so please reply by
Friday 22 Oct.
Please circulate to any contacts you have who may also want to endorse the
letter.
Sincerely
Patrick McCully
-----------------------------
International Rivers Network, USA
Both Ends, Netherlands
Mr James Wolfensohn
President
World Bank
Washington, DC
USA
Dear Mr Wolfensohn:
We are writing to update you about the latest developments regarding the
Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) and to urge you to inform us on what steps the
Bank will undertake to fulfil its responsibilities to mitigate the negative
effects of this Bank-sponsored project. We would also like to know what is
the Bank's current and future involvement in other projects related to the
Narmada Valley Development Project. We wish to emphasise that the
Government of India is still legally obligated to meet the terms and
conditions in its loan and credit agreements with the Bank on this project
(see Memo from Ibrahim F.I. Shihata to D.J. Wood, March 30, 1993).
Following the submission of the report of the Bank-commissioned Independent
Review of the Sardar Sarovar dam and irrigation project (June 18th 1992),
the Indian Government and the World Bank agreed in March 1993 that the
World Bank would not extend further support for the project. In 1995 the
Supreme Court ordered construction on the dam wall to be suspended, with
the dam at a height of 80 metres above sea level. Unfortunately in February
1999, on the grounds of false information submitted by the state
governments, the Supreme Court allowed the dam to be raised by a further
five metres.
An NGO-fact finding team including some of the signatories recently went to
the Narmada Valley in order to get a better understanding of the impact of
SSP seven years after the Morse Commission's Independent Review. The team
visited resettlement sites as well as villages which are to be submerged,
and ones which are already partly submerged, in the states of Gujarat,
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. From what we have seen and learned from
villagers and local experts the scale of social and economic hardship and
environmental destruction due to forced displacement, construction works
and submergence is likely to surpass even the findings and projections of
the Morse Commission.
The people we met at resettlement sites had suffered extreme economic
hardship and psychological trauma. Many had been displaced under conditions
of intimidation and physical violence by government authorities. Land of
totally inadequate quality and quantity has been made available to the
oustees. We heard numerous accounts of broken promises, threats and neglect
from the government authorities.
We observed that people at resettlement sites are suffering from a high
incidence of illness and malnutrition, and a sense of mental distress and
disorientation. Communities and even families have been separated and
fragmented among numerous different sites. Because they have lost their
access to the river and forest commons, people have lost their access to
free fodder, fuelwood, medicinal plants, food and other essential products.
Unable to eke out a living in the new resettlement sites, many villagers
have even returned to their (partially submerged) original villages.
Tribal families who previously were able to meet most of their basic needs
and sustain their cultural identity from a diverse natural environment are
now exposed to dependency and exploitation by money lenders, land owners
and traders, or face destitution in urban slums. We also witnessed how
thriving rural economies in non-tribal areas face destruction due to
submergence. Hundreds of villages, tens of thousands of hectares of fertile
arable land, forests, ancient temples and sacred burial grounds are to be
sacrificed.
Years after project construction began there is still no overall
resettlement and compensation plan. It is estimated that the number of
people to be displaced or otherwise harmed by the dam reservoir, the
irrigation canals, the construction colony, downstream impacts wildlife
sanctuary, catchment treatment and backwaters will be considerably larger
than the number anticipated when the Morse Commission submitted its report
(which was also far larger than the number claimed when the World Bank
approved the project).
The part-filled reservoir is already causing serious hardship in the
villages we visited along the banks of the Narmada. Riverside vegetable
gardens and fields have been submerged. With no other source of potable
water, villagers are forced to drink from the muddy reservoir leading to
increases in gastro-intestinal illnesses, especially among children. The
thick deposits of mud created along the edge of the reservoir were a
serious nuisance in previous years, making it difficult to fetch water and
to wash, and trapping cattle. This year the mud became fatal: since July
two people, a seven-year-old girl and an elderly man, have drowned after
becoming stuck in the mud. The reservoir has also flooded paths and cut off
villages from each other and from towns outside the valley. Other
consequences of the part-built dam are a steep rise in malaria cases in
villages near the reservoir, and increases in snake bites and crocodile
attacks.
In view of the fate of the oustees who have already been displaced, the
tens of thousands of villagers who have yet to move have no confidence in
the capacity and commitment of the relevant state governments with regard
to resettlement and rehabilitation. The people are persistent in their
refusal to move, despite the hardships they face because of the reservoir,
and repeatedly state that they are prepared to face the rising waters since
no alternative options are available which would enable them to continue a
decent life elsewhere.
During this monsoon, hundreds of villagers and activists stayed in the
houses by the Sardar Sarovar reservoir and bravely faced the rising waters
to show their opposition to submergence. In some houses, the water rose to
knee-height, in others to people's waists, in once case up to the people's
necks.
Just as the number of people predicted to lose their livelihoods to the
project have been dramatically underestimated, so has the final economic
cost of the project. When the Planning Commission sanctioned the project,
it was estimated to cost just under $3 billion at current prices. Now
project authorities agree the cost will not be less than $4.5 billion.
Project critics believe the actual cost will be more than twice this.
Yet, SSP is unlikely to deliver the benefits on the basis of which it has
been justified. For a number of reasons, at least one-third of the
projected command area will not get irrigation waters. These reasons (many
confirmed by the Bank's own Project Completion Reports) include:
* the overestimation of the amount of water in the Narmada in
original project plans;
* the exaggerated irrigation efficiency used by project planners;
* the promotion of water-intensive sugar cane growing in the areas
near the head of the canal;
* the current plans to use water for industrial and municipal uses
although no water was allocated for these uses in original project plans,
* the need to allocate water for the 150 kilometres of river and rich
estuary region downstream of the Sardar Sarovar dam. This region needs
water for domestic, industrial, agriculture, fisheries, and navigation
uses, and to push back seawater. Yet no allowance is made in planning
documents for downstream needs.
It is clear that the inevitable shortfall in water availability will be
felt most by those at the tail end of the huge canal system - the poor and
drought-prone districts of Kutch and Saurashtra in whose name the project
is being built. Even if the tailenders were to receive the amount of water
promised this would still only be enough to benefit 1.6% of the cultivable
area of Kutch and 9% of the cultivable area of Saurashtra. Gujarat
officials claim that alternative solutions can solve the water problems of
the remaining areas of Kutch and Saurashtra. But if 'alternative solutions'
are good enough for 98.4% of Kutch and 91% of Saurashtra, they must also be
good enough for the remaining areas.
In 1992, the Morse Commission wrote: "The opposition, especially in the
submergence area, has ripened into hostility. So long as this hostility
endures, progress will be impossible except as a result of unacceptable
means." The Morse Commission was right. Construction of Sardar Sarovar has
only been able to continue because of the unacceptable and illegal flooding
of villages and the repression of peaceful protests. If the dam is raised
any further it is certain that the repression will be intensified.
The Bank's initial support for SSP brought considerable legitimation to the
project and has greatly contributed to the humanitarian disaster which is
unfolding in the Narmada Valley. We therefore request you to inform us what
the Bank has done and what it plans to do to ensure that the Indian
government adheres to the terms of the SSP credit and loan agreements,
notably with regard to resettlement and rehabilitation.
Furthermore, we request you to inform us whether the Bank is presently
making financial assistance available - for example through agriculture or
power sector loans - to the Sardar Sarovar dam and irrigation projects, the
Narmada Sagar dam and irrigation project and/or any other projects forming
part of the Narmada Valley Development Project, or whether the Bank is
considering such support in future.
In view of the Bank's role in the crucial initial phases of this project,
we consider the Bank co-responsible for the social hardship and economic
and ecological damages resulting from the Sardar Sarovar Dam. We call upon
you to urge the Indian government to fulfil its obligations vis-à-vis the
people affected by SSP and to halt any further increase in the height of
the dam pending a comprehensive and participatory review of the project by
an independent tribunal. Disbursements and approvals of any World Bank
loans for Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra should only be made when
these conditions have been met.
A copy of this letter will be shared with the governors of the World Bank
and the parliamentary development committees of the respective donor
countries.
Yours sincerely,
Juliette Majot
Lori Udall
Paul Wolvekamp
Endorsed by: