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dam-l LS: Letter to ADB re Nam Theun-Hinboun



INTERNATIONAL RIVERS NETWORK
1847 Berkeley Way
Berkeley CA 94703


October 29, 1999									6 pages total


Mr. Khalid Rahman
Manager
Energy Sector (West)
Asian Development Bank
Fax: 632 632 6816


Dear Mr. Rahman

I write concerning the Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project. It has been almost
a year now since the ADB’s Special Review Mission to the project site last
November. The Aide Memoir resulting from this visit recognized that the
project had had serious impacts on the livelihoods of thousands of people
living around the project impact area, and that most of these people had
not been compensated for their losses. The Memoir outlined a series of
actions that were intended to “clearly identify project impacts on all
villages within the newly defined Project impact zone”, in order to “allow
THPC [Theun-Hinboun Power Company] to immediately and adequately
compensate” villagers for their losses. 

According to the Aide Memoir, the first step in this process was for the
THPC to prepare a survey form and train approximately 25 interviewers to
collect information from all project-affected villages and collate and
analyze data. The process of negotiation and provision of compensation was
expected to commence immediately after the survey information was collated,
and to be completed in approximately eight weeks. The survey was carried
out in April 1999, four months after the scheduled date. 

IRN initially welcomed the Aide Memoir, which seemed to represent a step in
the right direction. However, as of August 1999, it appears that little has
been done to ameliorate the conditions faced by villagers affected by the
project, and that the situation in the project area is deteriorating. New
information which is outlined in the attachment to this letter, reveals
that the actions promised by THPC have not been carried out in an
acceptable manner, and people remain without compensation. The situation is
extremely serious. 

One village leader told IRN, “Our lives are in ruins and if something is
not done to improve the situation we may not be able to survive in the
village for more than about three years.  We may have to move away to
somewhere else.”

Our investigations have revealed that the ADB and the THPC have failed to
live up to their own promises and commitments to the environment and local
people living in the Theun-Hinboun impacted area, and that a much more
sincere effort is needed to ensure that long term environmental and
socio-economic impacts are assessed in detail, with the full participation
of affected people and local government officials.  It will also be
necessary for a detailed schedule to be devised that will provide for
compensation to villagers who are now facing serious long-term
project-derived impacts. It has been 21 months since villagers first
observed many of the impacts from the project, and efforts need to be made
to seriously address the compensation issue as soon as possible.  The
welfare of many thousands of disadvantaged rural people is dependent on
immediate action.

The ADB has policies in place that require it to ensure that people are not
worse off after an ADB-funded project than before. I hope you will do
everything in your power to ensure that the communities affected by
Theun-Hinboun are treated respectfully and in accordance with these policies. 

I await your response to these important issues.


Yours sincerely



Ms. Aviva Imhof
South-East Asia Campaigner


Encl.


cc	Ms. Christine Wallich, Director, IWD
	Mr. Warren Evans, Manager, Environment Division
	Ms. Anita Kelles-Viitanen, Director, Social Development Division
	Executive Directors
	Ms. Nancy Katz, US Treasury
	Mr. Viraphonh Viravong, General Manager, Electricité du Laos
Mr. E.F. Hourihan, General Manager, Theun-Hinboun Power Company
Mr. Singkham Phonvisay, Director General, Department of Livestock and Fisheries


Summary of Theun-Hinboun Impacts Identified by IRN in August 1999

In mid-August, IRN visited the project site and interviewed people in nine
different villages located along the Hinboun, the Nam Kading, and around
the headpond and powerhouse. The names and positions of villagers and
villages were recorded, but due to security concerns only two villages will
be named in this summary. This is because previous experiences in the area
have revealed that village informants may be subjected to direct or
indirect intimidation if their identities are revealed. 

IRN found that negotiations with villagers regarding compensation had not
yet commenced and adequate compensation had not been provided to affected
communities. Villagers have been given very little information about the
project or the compensation process, and are frustrated and angry. 

The following is a summary of IRN’s findings. 

Downstream in the Hinboun River

Three villages situated next to the Hinboun River downstream from the
confluence with the Nam Hai were visited. All of these villages are
situated outside of the originally defined project impact area, but within
the expanded impact area. 

Representatives from all three villages reported that a group of
interviewers from Theun-Hinboun Power Company (THPC) visited their village
in April 1999. We presume these are the researchers from the National
University of Laos and other institutions that were referred to in the
November 1998 Aide Memoir. Villagers universally reported dissatisfaction
with the surveyers. They were unsure of the exact purpose of the survey
because the interviewers did not openly explain their objectives. Villagers
felt that the interviewers did not spend enough time in the village to
adequately assess the impacts of the project, and that certain relevant
issues, such as those related to compensation for loss of fisheries and
fishing gear, were not discussed during the interview. The interview
process was not participatory, and was primarily based on a survey
questionnaire.

“They were in such a rush.  They only spent an hour in the village, and
their driver didn’t even get out of the vehicle.  They didn’t ask us in
detail about the impacts of the dam, and we were only allowed to answer the
questions they asked.  We didn’t have the opportunity to tell them about
other impacts that we were not questioned about.  There was no time.  They
didn’t answer our questions about compensation either.  They didn’t provide
us with any information.”

All three villages reported problems with drinking water supplies. Prior to
the project, villagers consumed boiled water from the Nam Hinboun, but the
river water is now too turbid to drink after boiling. Some villages have
resorted to buying bottled water in the dry season for home use. Others
have to collect water from shallow wells situated 500 to 700 meters away
from the village. All three villages have been promised wells from the
THPC, but none have yet been provided. 

Fisheries have been significantly affected. Villagers estimated that fish
consumption had dropped from a daily average of approximately 1 kilogram
per day to less than 0.5 kg per day. Income from fish sales has also
decreased dramatically. Higher water levels, faster currents and increased
turbidity were blamed for the declines in fish catch. Many people have lost
gillnets which were swept away by the wildly fluctuating water currents.
Since one 12 cm meshed gillnet costs about 1,000 Thai baht, which is a
considerable investment for a poor villager, few are willing to risk buying
expensive fishing gear anymore. No-one has been provided with compensation
for these lost nets, let alone for fisheries losses.

Apart from loss of family fishing incomes, collective community income
derived from fishing had also decreased significantly. Many villages
situated along the Nam Hinboun manage fish conservation areas in the deep
parts of the river. In these areas, fishing is prohibited for most of the
year, but between October and January the areas are given to individual
villagers. The cost of each concession ranges from 500 to 10,000 Thai baht
each. In one village visited, the concession cost was 2,000 baht per season
prior to the dam closing.   However, in 1998/1999 the area was given out
for 1,000 baht because of the decline in fisheries. Yet the fisher was only
able to catch 200 baht worth of fish, compared to the approximately 10,000
baht that the concession previously generated.  Therefore, village leaders
don’t expect that anybody will want to take the concession in the coming
year, even though in the past it was so popular that villagers had to
randomly pick names from a hat.  
 
In one village, people reported that every family had lost their vegetable
gardens as a result of flooding caused by the project. In this village, dry
season vegetable gardens could no longer be grown directly next to the
river due to fears of flooding, and villagers have had to halve the size of
their gardens because of the extra effort required to haul water up the
bank by hand. This has resulted in lower incomes and less fresh vegetables
for family consumption.

In all three villages, villagers expressed concern about the increased risk
of flooding during the wet season. Villagers stated that radio reports
announcing when water levels are scheduled to rise and fall are useless
because they are located far downstream from the Nam Hai, and as a result
the water level changes upstream do not coincide with the changes near
their village. 

One village leader stated: 

“We are not greedy or picky people. We only want to be compensated for the
difficulties we have had to deal with since the dam was built.  Please help
us solve our problems.”

In the project site/reservoir area

Three villages were visited in this area: Ban Kengbit located near the dam
site, Ban Namsanam along the tailrace canal and one other village located
along the reservoir. 

Ban Kengbit is a community of 73 families situated adjacent to the road
leading to the dam site, next to the headpond. Despite the fact that their
village is situated next to the road leading to the dam, and is passed by
THPC officials on a daily basis, villagers were upset that they have never
received detailed information about dam-related issues affecting them,
including the compensation determination process. While the THPC and the
ADB maintain that villagers at Ban Kengbit relocated voluntarily in order
for them to be adjacent to the road, villagers maintain that this is only
partially the truth.  Villagers claim that although they moved on their own
initiative, they deemed it necessary because the reservoir would have left
them stranded on a narrow peninsula, with poor access to their fields and
other places. While it was not forcible relocation in the strictest sense
of the term, neither was it truly voluntary. Some compensation should have
been provided, but according to villagers none has been forthcoming.
Furthermore, some houses had to be relocated a second time after it was
found that they obstructed the road to the dam or were situated under a
power line. 

Villagers claimed that they had been promised 100 sheets of metal roofing
per family for houses in compensation, but none has been forthcoming. They
were reportedly promised electricity free of charge, but now they have been
told that they will have to pay at least part of the costs of installation.
They have been promised three drilled wells for drinking water, but have
received none. All they have received is roofing, cement and some labor
costs for their village school. Villagers were particularly disappointed
that the THPC did not follow through with their alleged promise to provide
a buffalo to the village to compensate for the destruction of the village’s
cemetery.  Villagers wanted to sacrifice the buffalo to satisfy the spirits
of their dead ancestors.   

Villagers living around the reservoir reported dramatic declines in fish
catches since the closing of the dam. People claim that the dam has blocked
migrations of fish up the Nam Theun River, leaving few fish in the
reservoir. The water in the reservoir is also deep and difficult to fish.
Fishing gear for deep-water fishing is much more expensive than gear
previously used. No compensation has been provided for losses in fish
catches, or for the increased investment in fishing gears. Fishers have
also not been compensated for fishing gears lost when the dam was closed
and the water levels in the reservoir started to unpredictably fluctuate. 

Vegetable gardens along the reservoir have also been affected by higher
water levels. Soils in upper areas are not as fertile as on the riverbanks,
and much more effort is required to water gardens on high ground. The
result has been a dramatic decline in vegetable gardens. Villagers should
not only be provided with compensation to cover the loss of gardens during
the initial closure of the dam, but should also be compensated for losses
in income and subsistence food for at least the life of the project. 

Because of a dramatic decline in cash income due to loss of fisheries and
vegetable gardens, one village has had to resort to greater shifting
cultivation. However, villagers don’t expect a good crop in 1999 due to
insect damage. Now that the funds for buying rice are no longer available,
the food security situation in the village has become precarious. Most
families in the village don’t have enough rice to feed themselves all year.

One villager stated, ”We expected that the dam would bring prosperity to
our village.  We believed that the reservoir fisheries would be plentiful,
and that free electricity would be provided to our community.  Now we have
woken up to reality, and we don’t like what we have experienced so far. We
are not hopeful for the future.”

At Ban Namsanam, which is located adjacent to the tailrace canal, the ADB
claimed that the village was relocating across the canal “due to reasons
unrelated to the project.” However, villagers told IRN that they had to
leave their village because of impacts caused by a road built by the THPC.
The road apparently obstructed natural water drainage patterns from the
village, leading to flooding in the village and sanitation problems, which
in turn partially resulted in a cholera epidemic last year, in which two
people died. After being hit with cholera, many villagers felt that it was
necessary for them to move. The amount of compensation provided has been
very low and entirely unacceptable to the community. According to
villagers, each household has been given 100,000 kip in cash compensation
(a little over US$10 at the time of investigation), 15 nails of metal
roofing, 2.5 kg of roofing nails, and between 3-5 kg of standard nails.
This is not nearly sufficient to cover the costs of moving. 

Villagers also claimed that they were promised electricity and clean
drinking water at the new relocation site, but the 50 families that have
already moved there have not been supplied with either. The soil at the new
site is rocky and unsuitable for vegetable gardens or fruit tree
cultivation. To make matters worse, villagers are unable to bathe, collect
water or fish in the tailrace canal situated directly in front of the
relocation site. They have been provided with no explanation for this, but
a former government official familiar with the project provided an
explanation. Apparently a villager who had been fishing in the canal a year
ago died for an unknown reason and his body fell into the canal. Operatiors
had to stop power generation for a few hours to dry out the canal and
recover the body. This action cost the THPC a significant amount of money,
so it was decided that the best way to prevent such a problem in the future
was to ban the use of the canal altogether.  

Downstream in the Kading River

Three villages living along the Nam Kading were visited. Villagers reported
severe declines in fish catches as a result of the sharp decrease in water
levels in the Nam Kading. Incomes from selling fish have reportedly fallen
50%, and fish consumption has also declined from an average of about 2 kg a
day per family to about 0.5 kg a day. Villagers state that some large and
valuable species of fish no longer migrate up the Nam Kading due to the
decreased flow. Villagers have lost gillnets due to unpredictable changes
in water levels in the Nam Kading. One village reported losing between 300
and 400 gillnets since the dam commenced operation. One villager said,

“Before when it rained upriver we knew water levels would rise, but now
water levels sometimes drop when it rains, and when the weather is good
water levels sometimes quickly rise.  We have no way of knowing when our
fishing gears are at risk of being swept away.” 

Declines in Nam Kading water levels during the dry season have seriously
impeded boat transportation. The quality of soil along river banks has
declined because of the lower water levels, which has resulted in decreased
vegetable production. In one village, villagers claimed that about 20 pump
wells that used to supply water year-round had gone dry or close to dry
during the dry seasons of 1998 and 1999. This indicates that reduced water
levels in the Nam Kading may have caused a lowering of the water table. 





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Aviva Imhof
South-East Asia Campaigner
International Rivers Network
1847 Berkeley Way, Berkeley CA 94703 USA
Tel: + 1 510 848 1155 (ext. 312), Fax: + 1 510 848 1008
Email: aviva@irn.org, Web: http://www.irn.org
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