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dam-l LS: The Economist on dams in Asia
The Economist , 19 Nov 99
Water power in Asia : The dry facts about dams
LOOK across Asia, and you might think that the Big Dam is alive and
well. The region is
home to much of the world's dam building, including two of its most
ambitious projects:
those in India's Narmada valley and China's Three Gorges. Though
activists have long
complained about such giant dams, which flood forests and displace
legions of people,
Asia's politicians remain defiant. China is forging ahead with the Three
Gorges dam,
despite its huge cost: some $30 billion officially, though critics say
$75 billion. The
Narmada project has already displaced many tens of thousands, and India
vows to stay
the course.
Officials point to many splendid benefits that are to flow from these
projects. The Three
Gorges dam is designed both to generate some 20 gigawatts of electricity
and to help
control the floodwaters of the temperamental Yangzi river. India's
planners promise that
the Narmada project will likewise deliver electricity and irrigation.
Such ambitions are
understandable. Lack of irrigation relegates millions of Indians to
subsistence farming.
In China, the floods last year destroyed 5m homes. Yet these may well be
the last of the
really big dams in Asia.
Ironically, one of the arguments now used against big dams is the very
mix of motives
long used to justify them. That is because these motives have often
proved, in practice,
to be in conflict with each other. Flood control, for example, requires
officials to throw
open a dam's gates; doing so means irrigation water or power production
is lost.
Releasing water to meet green goals, such as boosting fish populations
in the dry
season, means lost electricity sales.
The environmental credentials of dams are also under scrutiny. Once,
they were
embraced by greens as a source of clean and endlessly renewable energy,
but no
longer. The flooding that accompanies big dams in Asia usually submerges
large
tropical forests. Recent studies show that, as such vegetation decays,
it can release
lots of methane, a much more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon
dioxide. Also, as
Vijay Paranjpye of India's Pune University notes, dams in the tropics
must endure the
ravages of monsoons. One common result, he says, is silting-up, which
may within a
few decades cut the original generating capacity by 70% or even 80%.
Another obstacle is that the flow of aid money is drying up. Since big
dams are so
controversial, even the World Bank, once the biggest force behind big
dams, has
grown skittish. The awful mess it got itself into in India explains why.
The agency
suffered a famous setback earlier this decade when a highly critical
outside report led to
its departure from the Narmada project. That prompted a broader internal
review, which
concluded that governments often fail "the acid test" it recommends for
dams- "the
restoration of incomes and standards of living of project-affected people."
This points to the thorniest challenge facing big dams: the social cost.
In the past, Asia's
heavy-handed governments bothered little about the unfortunates
displaced by dams;
usually, officials merely made grand promises of cash or land. Though
some displaced
people do now find better lives, most do not. Some promises are soon
forgotten;
others, particularly "land for land", prove impractical in densely
populated Asia. Still, the
slow but steady advance of democracy in Asia suggests it will be
increasingly hard to
dismiss lightly the social impacts of dams.
That, anyway, is the hope of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), which
is working to
build a broad consensus on agreed principles for big dams. Achim
Steiner, the
secretary-general of the WCD, which was created by governments, development
agencies and non-governmental organisations, notes that even Asia's
zealous builders
of big dams "are being pulled into global principles by market forces."
This is because
they face a squeeze from both private and public investors.
The decline in aid money raises the costs of financing. And the
inevitable protests and
legal wrangles facing such projects add financial risk, which translates
into higher costs.
Another blow is the continuing deregulation of the global power
industry, which shifts
financing to the private sector-and so to low-risk projects with quick
returns. That means
away from big dams and towards gas-fired plants.
But, if big dams are out, small ones need not be. They can achieve many
of the benefits
promised by big dams at a fraction of the cost-and with the support of
locals. This will
grow ever more important, argues Mr Steiner, because "more democratic
societies will
insist on fuller costing of dams."
And the locals are growing in importance. In India, for example,
pressure from
grassroots organisations is forcing the government to scale back its
plans for the
Narmada valley. The half-finished Sardar Sarovar dam, which is at the
heart of the
scheme, will probably never be completed. Smitu Kothari of Lokayan, a
social-policy
think-tank in Delhi, insists that, "of the 3,300-odd dam projects that
were originally
envisioned in the Narmada valley, there will be a 70% reduction." The
number of dams
is sure to be cut and the heights of those remaining reduced; many will
also be
redesigned to reduce their social and environmental impact.
Even in China, the big-dam juggernaut is not quite as formidable as it
once seemed.
Doris Shen of the International Rivers Network, an American
non-governmental group,
points to the admission a few weeks ago by Chinese officials that the
$3.4 billion Ertan
dam, the biggest yet completed in China, is having difficulties selling
its electricity,
which is significantly more expensive than that from smaller power
stations. As the true
costs of the Three Gorges dam soar toward $75 billion, she reckons, only
hubris or
kickbacks will save the project.