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dam-l LS: World Bank told: pay up or decommission Pak Mun
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS NETWORK
1847 Berkeley Way, Berkeley CA 94703, USA
Tel: (510) 848 1155, Fax: (510) 848 1008
PRESS RELEASE
Thursday, December 9, 1999
Aviva Imhof
South-East Asia Campaigner
World Bank told: pay up or decommission Pak Mun
The World Bank should pay compensation to communities affected by the Pak
Mun Dam in Thailand, a report released today by International Rivers
Network asserts. The report documents the Bank’s involvement in the project
over the past decade from its earliest promises that communities would
benefit from the project, to its current claim that Pak Mun resettlement is
one of the best examples amongst Bank-assisted projects.
The report, The Struggle for the Mun River, states that, “The Bank remains
accountable … [to Pak Mun communities] because of its severely flawed
process of project development, its failure to address subsequent impacts
of the project, and finally, its failure to ensure proper compensation to
communities now facing unmitigated project impacts.” The report was
released on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Pak Mun dam struggle.
The 136 MW Pak Mun Dam, which was completed in 1994, was built by the
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand with US$23 million in
financing from the World Bank. Even though the Bank only contributed around
10 per cent of the project’s costs, it played a key role in the
development, promotion and construction of the project.
“The Bank cannot continue to renege on its responsibilities to dam-affected
people by claiming it played a small role in developing these projects,”
says Ms. Aviva Imhof, one of the report’s authors and IRN’s South-East Asia
Campaigner. “It is time for the World Bank to take responsibility for the
role it played in the development of Pak Mun dam, own up to its mistakes,
and ensure that people are compensated. If the Bank can’t do this, then it
should work with the government to decommission the dam, as the villagers
are demanding.”
For nine months, more than 3,000 villagers have been occupying the Pak Mun
dam site and say they will stay until their demands are met. They are
demanding 15 rai (2.4 hectares) of land per family in compensation for
4,500 families for permanent loss of fisheries income. Tomorrow, people
will converge on Pak Mun for tenth anniversary celebrations. There will be
a forum with well-known Thai academics and the closing ceremony for the Mun
River walk, a two-week journey through the Mun River villages.
The Struggle for the Mun River shows that the Bank had advance warning of
the project’s impacts on fisheries, public health and the livelihoods of
villagers living around the dam site, and chose to ignore or dismiss the
information. Contrary to World Bank policy, the environmental impact
assessments for the project were conducted almost 10 years prior to project
approval, and contained no baseline data on fisheries, incomes of
potentially affected people, or the number of people who would be
resettled. Public participation was virtually non-existent.
The impacts of the dam have been remarkably close to what was predicted by
villagers in 1990 and 1991. More than 20,000 people have been affected by
drastic reductions in fish populations upstream of the dam site, health
impacts, and other changes to their livelihoods.
For a copy of the full report, go to www.irn.org, or email aviva@irn.org.
For further information contact Aviva Imhof or Chainarong Srettachau,
Director, South-East Asia Rivers Network: Tel: 66 53 221157,
searin@loxinfo.co.th.
___________________________________
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Struggle for the Mun River: The World Bank’s Involvement in the Pak Mun
Dam, Thailand
For over ten years, the Mun River has been a battleground between the World
Bank, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), and the more
than 20,000 people who depended on the river’s bounty for their
livelihoods. Construction on the 136 MW hydropower project was started in
1991 and completed in 1994, at a total cost of US$264 million.
The World Bank, while contributing only 10 per cent of the total costs,
played a key role in the development, promotion, and construction of this
project, and therefore has responsibility for the on-going impacts. In
1998, the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED) produced a
report on the Bank’s Recent Experience with Involuntary Resettlement. The
OED report claims that Pak Mun had “a satisfactory resettlement outcome”
and that Pak Mun was “among the best experiences with resettlement among
Bank-assisted projects.”
Currently over 4,500 people are living in a protest camp at the Pak Mun dam
site. They demand that the Bank acknowledge its responsibility for the
project’s impacts, and that the Bank pay reparations to over 4,000 families
who have permanently lost income and food sources from the once rich
fisheries of the Mun River. The OED report insinuates that this unrest is
driven by greed and the desire to be included in EGAT's "generous
compensation" to project-affected people. This report examines this
serious allegation as well as the underlying causes of unrest in the
project area and the World Bank's responsibility in addressing these causes.
Poor Process of Implementation
The project suffered from such a poor process of implementation that it is
not surprising it has been plagued by controversy since its inception. Not
only were the environmental impact assessments for the project conducted
almost 10 years prior to project approval, but they were also based on
obsolete project parameters. The studies included no baseline data on
fundamental issues such as fisheries, incomes of potentially affected
people or even the number of people who would be resettled. Public
participation was virtually non-existent. And throughout this process, the
World Bank played a key role, backing up the spurious claims of EGAT, and
failing to take into consideration the objections to the project raised by
villagers, NGOs, technical experts, and even their own Executive Directors.
Resettlement was handled badly. Neither EGAT nor the World Bank knew the
number of affected households at the time of project approval, which was
seven months after construction had begun. While in 1991 the Bank claimed
that 262 families would need to be resettled, in fact 912 families were
relocated and an additional 780 households lost part, or all of their land.
Villagers, NGOs and scientists repeatedly warned the Bank that the EIA
failed to include an investigation of fish species and their migratory
patterns in the Mun and Mekong Rivers, an assessment of the economic
benefits of the Mun river's existing fisheries, and an investigation of the
impacts of the dam on the Mun river ecosystem. The Bank admitted in
December 1991 that the EIA did not include “systematic and detailed studies
of fishes and their migratory patterns”, but instead of commissioning
additional studies, the Bank relied on the assumption that reservoir
fisheries would result in a 50% increase in fish yield. The irony of this
is that the Bank consistently maintained that the project was a
run-of-river dam that would not even have a reservoir.
Community Impacts
“Pak Mun dam destroyed our river, the Mun river. The dam destroyed our
fishing communities and our culture. To destroy a river, to destroy
communities and culture, is a terrible thing.”
The impacts of Pak Mun dam have been remarkably close to what was predicted
by villagers in 1990 and 1991. Formerly close and self-sufficient
communities have disintegrated. Resettlement resulted in villages being
divided between different locations, conflicts within villages between pro
and anti-dam forces, and families being separated as people moved away in
search of additional income. The reservoir inundated community forests,
pastures and riverbank vegetable gardens, affecting thousands of people.
Fisheries have been decimated by the project. In October 1999, villagers
reported that fish catches have decreased from up to 100 kilograms per day
to virtually nothing. Whereas before the dam, fishers reported that they
could identify 122 species of fish and 4 species of shrimp, in 1999, they
could identify only 9 species of fish upstream of the dam, and 9 species of
fish downstream of the dam, and only two species are found both upstream
and downstream. Yet the World Bank OED claims there is “no conclusive
evidence of any impact by Pak Mun Dam on fish populations, fish catch
level, or change in composition of species in the reservoir.”
Mitigation and Compensation Measures
Throughout the struggle for the Mun River, the World Bank and EGAT
maintained that all project-related impacts would be mitigated, and that
villagers would be compensated for their losses. A fish ladder would allow
fish to pass the dam. Stocking of the reservoir with fish and shrimp would
increase fish production in the area. Villagers who had to be resettled
would be provided with compensation which would contribute to their
“development”.
Yet today, after a 10 year battle, villagers maintain that they were better
off before the dam, and that if it were up to them, they would remove the
dam and return to their old lives. Measures designed to mitigate loss of
fisheries have proved woefully inadequate in comparison to the natural
biodiversity of the Mun River. The compensation received by those resettled
did not equal the replacement cost of equivalent land and houses. Those
resettled by the dam face a struggle to survive. Many are in debt. Some
have no land security and face jail sentences for trespass on public
communal lands. Many thousands of people have been affected by fisheries
losses. After a long struggle, some have received compensation for loss of
fisheries during the three year construction period, yet none have received
compensation for permanent losses.
CONCLUSION
The World Bank owes it to the villagers to visit the site, listen to their
stories, and consider their demands, without the presence of the Thai
government and EGAT. The Bank must take responsibility for the problems now
being faced by villagers, and must work with the villagers to find
acceptable solutions. Villagers are demanding 15 rai of land per family in
compensation for permanent loss of fisheries, as agreed to by the Chavalit
government. They also want solutions to the health problems they are
currently facing. If this compensation is not forthcoming, they want the
dam to be removed.
In the context of the current power surplus in Thailand, it is worth
considering whether this dam, which supplies only a fraction of Thailand’s
peaking power needs, is worth the additional investment of $58 million that
would be required to adequately compensate communities. If not, then the
dam should be removed and the Mun River restored. This would satisfy the
villagers, and would be much cheaper in the long run for the Thai government.
For a copy of the full report, go to www.irn.org, or email Aviva Imhof,
aviva@irn.org
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Aviva Imhof
South-East Asia Campaigner
International Rivers Network
1847 Berkeley Way, Berkeley CA 94703 USA
Tel: + 1 510 848 1155 (ext. 312), Fax: + 1 510 848 1008
Email: aviva@irn.org, Web: http://www.irn.org
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