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dam-l ENRON & KARNALI PROJECT IN NEPAL (fwd)



From cwaterp@del3.vsnl.net.in  Fri Mar  3 20:21:28 2000
From: Himanshu Thakkar <cwaterp@del3.vsnl.net.in>
Subject: ENRON & KARNALI PROJECT IN NEPAL

SOURCE: KATHMANDU POST, MARCH 3, 2000


Enron between myth and reality

 By Puran P Bista

 Enron, the Texas based energy power company that has applied for
“letter of intent” to conduct the
 preliminary survey of the 10,800-MW Karnali-Chisapani hydro-project,
has become a “US-made mythical
 beast” in the eyes of those who do not believe in development. What
they talk about is prosperity
 without light. This is why Enron has not been given the licence to
conduct a survey.

 A decade ago, Enron faced similar problems in India when Hindu
fundamentalists belonging to Bal
 Thackaray’s Shiva Sena opposed the two billion plus dollar project at
Dhabol in western Maharashtra.

 The licence to construct the Dhabol project was awarded by the Maratha
sugar baron Sharad Pawar. He
 was the state’s chief minister then. With the assembly elections of
1990, the Shiv Sena- BJP combine
 formed the government in Maharashtra state and halted the construction
of Dhabol project. Later, the
 Enron chief of India operations, Rebecca Mark met Bal Thackaray to
resume construction.

 If Maharashtra, which generates 75 percent of Indian revenue has so
many hitches awarding a project,
 how can anyone think the Nepalese have a better record of  awarding
projects like the
 Karnali-Chisapani to any multinational power company?

 After the opening of the Indian economy, the so-called Hindi heartland
- especially Bihar and Uttar
 Pradesh (UP) states - have lagged far behind other Indian states in
terms of development and economic
 growth. South Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka are an
example of this. Although Bihar is
 richer than other Indian states in mineral resources, South India has
overtaken even Indian states like
 Punjab and Haryana in economic growth. The truth is there is acute
shortage of energy in the Hindi
 heartland and New Delhi also has failed to meet the growing energy
demand.

 For this, I blame Kautilya’s Shastra, not his Arthashashtra. His
Shastra states that ‘any neighbour
 becomes an enemy, hence he or she cannot be trusted because he or she
is not a friend’. The decision
 taken by any Nepali or Indian political party so far on issues of
national development has, no matter how
 important they are, met a vertical end.  Probably, this is the reason
that has led us into darkness and
 inhuman conditions which none of us can see now without light.

 Every third person, for instance, in the Gangetic plains, not only
lives under acute poverty but is also an
 illiterate. Many educated persons in this region are Hindu
fundamentalists. They quote verses from the
 Gita just to hide the reality with myth. With misplaced nationalism
they also refer to the Shastra.

 The fact is that neither India nor Nepal have yet gotten over
Kautilya’s hangover. We look suspiciously
 at each other because, we who talk of 85,000 MW energy at home, have
never been able to directly
 voice our concern over the downstream benefits with India. The Mahakali
treaty is an example of our
 inability to negotiate. Otherwise, our political leaders could, at
least, have made India settle the issue of
 benefits before signing the treaty. It is sad to say that we have
started raising our voice on downstream
 benefits only after Enron applied for the survey licence. Our voice
has  become a cliche now. The reason
 why it is a cliche is what we see is neither new nor relevant. All
prime ministers and ministers for water
 resources of earlier governments have gone through the same exercise
again and again.

 A white-collar Indian hawk watching Nepali activities in South block
knows how many rivers (or what
 percentage of water) feed the people living in the Gangetic plains.
But  Benaras bred pundits preaching
 Kautilya’s Shastra in Kathmandu are not aware of any activity. There
will be a furore in India if waters of
 Nepali rivers are to be diverted within the country for irrigation or
storage purposes. Thus, most Indians
 see Enron as no better than a US made mythical beast that has come to
eat the ancestors’ property.
 New Delhi is likely to warn even Kathmandu not to divert waters, if we
reach an agreement with Enron,
 instead of talking on downstream benefits.

 Today for India, water has become more important than energy since
energy, it believes, is within its
 reach while water is not. Two Indian Dravid states of Karnataka and
Tamil Nadu have been fighting for
 water of Kaveri river for the last two decades. The last parliamentary
elections in both the states saw the
 intensity of water dispute. Tamil Nadu chief minister, Karunanidhi,
returned to power ensuring his
 farmers the Kaveri water. New Delhi fears possible centre-state clashes
whenever the former refuses to
 release water to the latter during dry season. Therefore, a
comprehensive settlement of Kaveri water has
 remained beyond BJP’s reach.

 Myth has it that we need to settle downstream benefits before issuing
the survey licence to Enron while
 the reality stands that India is, in no way, ready to talk on it. Under
such circumstances, how can the
 government issue the survey licence to Enron? Can Enron allocate 10
percent of the total project budget
 for development elsewhere such as education, health care,
transportation and industry? If Enron wants
 to construct Karnali-Chisapani, then it should be willing to sign a
contract that addresses our needs
 directly.

 The key point to realise before the survey licence is not downstream
benefits but two very different
 objectives : Enron wants to make profit and Nepal wants development.

 But the worry is: if Enron withdraws its application, foreign
investments may not enter the energy sector
 in future. Because, every one is aware of the damage the
environmentalists have done to projects in
 Narmada and Tehri dam in India. This was one of the reasons the World
Bank withdrew its loan for
 Arun-III.