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dam-l WHILE ELEPHANTS: DAMNED TEMPLES the story in latest (May 15, 2000) issue of Outlook

Source: Outlook, May 15, 2000 (www.outlookindia.com)

                   Damned Temples

Big dams have guzzled huge amounts of money but
                   have failed their objective miserably

SOME BIG

INCOMPLETE

IRRIGATION

PROJECTS

                   It’s clearly a case of fallen idols. Pandit
Jawaharlal
                   Nehru’s "temples of modern India" have failed to
deliver
                   and the old faithfuls now have to contend with a new,

                   young band of sceptics. As the debate over large dams

                   versus traditional methods of water harvesting
continues,
                   the rosy picture painted by the architects of these
                   temples is gradually losing its colour. A cursory
look at
                   the report card of some of India’s major and medium
                   irrigation projects reveals that despite their
                   ever-burgeoning project cost, they have miserably
failed
                   to achieve their projected potential. Data obtained
by
                   Outlook from the ministry of water resources show
that in
                   certain cases, some of these dams and canals don’t
                   irrigate even an inch of land.

                   The reasons for this may vary from lack of
infrastructure
                   and funds to people’s resistance. But the end result
is
                   clearly disappointing. Sources in the ministry of
water
                   resources say that in some cases the project is ready

                   but is not being used to its full capacity due to the
lack of
                   an efficient canal network. With each passing year
the
                   cumulative cost of the project spirals up, running
into
                   hundreds of crore of rupees without any apparent
benefit.

                                                               Sardar
Sarovar in
                                                                    J &
K


                                                                  Tehri
in UP


                   In this light, the argument of the inevitability of
big dams like the Sardar Sarovar
                   Project (SSP) or the Tehri dam comes under sharp
scrutiny. The anti-dam lobby
                   argues that when the created potential (what is meant
to be achieved) of already
                   existing projects is becoming hard to achieve, what
is the guarantee that the
                   hopes being raised by the proponents of big dams will
not prove to be a farce.
                   Says Himanshu Thakkar of the South Asia Network on
Dam, Rivers and People:
                   "They have created the projects but they have not
been able to utilise their full
                   potential."

                   The pro-SSP lobby, or for that matter even the
Gujarat government, has been
                   maintaining that big dams have become inevitable. The
fact that what the existing
                   projects actually achieve is far less than the
projected potential (see infographic
                   on page 29) provides a solid ground to the anti-big
dam lobby which says mega
                   projects eventually turn out to be white elephants.

                   Nirmal Sengupta of the Madras Institute for
Development Studies has conducted a
                   comprehensive study of the potential utilisation of
major irrigation projects. In his
                   study, prepared for the World Commission on Dams
(WCD), Sengupta observed:
                   "As per the irrigation department data, 13.7 per cent
of created potential in major
                   and medium irrigation projects in India is
unutilised. According to the land use
                   statistics collected by the revenue department,
underutilisation is about 25 per
                   cent."

                   Sengupta claims that if the full potential of the
existing major/ medium projects is
                   used, at least 40,52,000 hectares of land may be
brought under irrigation. Another
                   40,29,000 hectares can be irrigated by using the full
potential of minor projects.

                   But some figures present a depressing scenario. Work
on the Jamrani dam in
                   Nainital district of Uttar Pradesh began in 1975 with
an estimated cost of Rs 61.25
                   crore. The project was supposed to irrigate 66,000
hectares of land. But 25 years
                   later-and with the upgraded cost estimate of Rs 280
crore-the achieved potential is
                   only 21,000 hectares. The Gosikhurd project in
Maharashtra began two decades
                   ago with an estimated cost of Rs 461.11 crore. It had
the projected irrigation
                   potential of 2,50,800 hectares. In the eighth plan
the cumulative cost of the project
                   has increased by five times. Achieved potential:
zilch.

                   Similarly in Madhya Pradesh, the Rajghat II project
began in 1975 with the project
                   irrigation capacity of 1,16,600 hectares. Twenty-five
years later the cost went up
                   from Rs 309.21 crore to Rs 523.41 crore. But the
achieved potential remained only
                   9,000 hectares. Subarnarekha in Bihar (Rs 1,428
crore) had the projected
                   potential of 236.85 hectares when it was conceived
around 1975. In the last 25
                   years the cost of the project and its upgradation has
gone up to Rs 2,376 crore
                   but it has also failed to achieve the projected
target.

                   Even more striking is the attitude of the state
governments who have an interest in
                   not declaring a project complete. Once a project is
over, the Planning
                   Commission stops funding it. Therefore, in some
instances the state governments
                   declare their projects as ongoing so that the inflow
of funds from the Centre,
                   needed for the maintenance of the completed project,
doesn’t stop. The most
                   telling example probably is the Nagarjuna Sagar dam
in Andhra Pradesh. This
                   project began in the late 1950s and was estimated to
cost Rs 91.12 crore. Four
                   decades down the line it’s still on even though it
has more or less achieved its
                   ultimate potential of irrigating 895.28 thousand
hectares of land. The latest add-up
                   cost has run into Rs 1,000 crore.

                   Thakkar says that the solution doesn’t lie in large
dams. According to him, the
                   poor maintenance of the dams also affects their
potential adversely. It is a known
                   fact that some of the dams have collected huge
amounts of silt resulting in less
                   quantity of stored water. According to reports, a
38-foot high dam in Gujarat has
                   28 feet of silt. That means a dam which has the
capacity of storing 38 feet of
                   water holds only 10 feet water. The project
irrigation capacity will naturally go
                   down.

                   The question that begs an answer, therefore, is: what
is the rationale of going in
                   for mega projects for the development of agriculture
when the already existing
                   projects are lagging far behind in achieving their
projected objective? As the
                   country reels under one of its worst droughts, the
question becomes even more
                   important. Rosy pictures don’t really make reality
any less harsh.

                   By Rajesh Joshi