[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
DAM-L LS: The tragedy of Pak Moon Dam (fwd)
----- Forwarded message from owner-irn-mekong@netvista.net -----
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2000 11:37:58 -0700 (PDT)
Message-Id: <200010041837.e94IbwP18305@DaVinci.NetVista.net>
subject: LS: The tragedy of Pak Moon Dam
Sender: owner-irn-mekong@netvista.net
Precedence: bulk
The tragedy of Pak Moon Dam
Bangkok Post, Perspective, October 1, 2000
DAM REPORT: An authoritative new report about Thailand's most
controversial dam project confirms what local villagers have known
all along-it's simply a flop
Last June, fierce protests at Parliament by villagers affected by the
Pak Moon Dam in Ubon Ratchathani led to an independent government
review of the project. The following month, the government agreed to
open all the dam spillways for four months a year to allow for
environmental recovery, fish migration and spawning.
Meanwhile, the World Commission on Dams, established by the World
Conservation Union and the World Bank, has just completed the first
independent analysis of the dam. Edited excerpts follow.
PREDICTED VERSUS ACTUAL BENEFITS, COSTS, AND IMPACTS
Project cost
In May 1989, the Cabinet approved a budget of 3.88 billion baht (US$
155.2 million) for the project. In 1991, the National Economic and
Social Development Board (NESDB) approved a modified project cost of
6.6 billion baht (US$ 264 million). The final cost tally by EGAT in
1999 was 6.507 billion baht (US$ 260 million).
In nominal terms, the project cost increased by 68% from the original
estimates between 1989-99. Not including taxes and interest during
construction, the cost overruns in nominal terms are 91% over
original estimates in 1988. However, in real terms, (calculated at
constant 1998 prices) the actual total project cost did not differ
significantly from the original estimate in 1988.
Compensation and Resettlement costs increased from 231.55 million
baht (US$ 9.26 million) in EGAT's 1988 estimate to an actual
expenditure of 1,113.1 million baht (US$ 44.24 million) in 1999. In
real terms, resettlement costs increased by 182%. Compensation for
loss in fisheries, which was unanticipated in the original estimate,
accounted for 395.6 million baht by April 1999 (US$ 15.8 million).
Benefits - Hydropower
Pak Moon dam is located at the end of a large watershed where
rainfall and run- off vary considerably between dry and wet seasons.
During wet months, Pak Moon can turbine the daily inflow to serve the
four hour peak demand and can generate power in off-peak hours with
surplus water available. However, during the dry months the plant
cannot produce its full rated capacity for the 4 hour peak demand due
to insufficient water.
The output of the plant depends on the water level in the reservoir
and the tailwater level. The dam's power production peaks in the wet
season when it is least needed in the power system and is lowest in
the dry season when it is most needed. When the water levels in the
Mekong river are very high, the power plant will be shutdown for lack
of generating head. The operation records from the commissioning of
the plant in 1994 indicate that Pak Moon's average annual output has
been 290 GWh. In Egat's presentation to the Cabinet and World Bank
documents, Pak Moon featured as a 136 MW run of the river project to
serve peak needs. However, following the rules based on the daily
power output data between 1995-99, Pak Moon can use only 15% of its
capacity as reliable 4 hour peak capacity.
The actual dependable capacity of the dam project calculated from
daily power output between 1995-98, assuming that all available power
gets assigned to a four hour peak demand period, is only 20.81 MW.
However, the value adopted by Egat and sanctioned by the World Bank
is much higher at 150 MW.
Since 1993, responding to Egat's successful Demand Side Management
(DSM) programme, the sharp four hour demand peak has been replaced by
a flatter 13 hour plateau. During the dry season Pak Moon can supply
power over this extended period at further reduced capacity.
The actual operation of the dam is often different from what was
assumed in the planning studies. This type of operation may be
beneficial from an ancillary services point of view (such as
frequency and voltage regulation, Var control etc.), but the energy
benefits will be less than planned.
Recalculating the project's equalising discount rate assuming that
one would need one 21 MW gas turbine to provide the dependable
capacity of a 20.8 MW hydro plant, the current report reaches a value
of 7.88% which is below the shadow cost of capital in Thailand. When
the benefits of the ancillary electricity net support of the dam and
the green house gasses reduction benefit of the dam were included in
the evaluation of the dam, these benefits were not sufficient to make
the project economically justifiable.
Benefits - Irrigation
The Pak Moon project was presented for review to the NESDB in 1988
and to the Cabinet in 1989 as a multi-purpose development project. In
the 1991 World Bank SAR for the Third Power Project, besides
hydropower and irrigation, fisheries appeared as a major benefit from
the project. Irrigation benefits were not included in the economic
analysis of the project by the World Bank in its 1991 Staff Appraisal
Report. The irrigation benefits of a run of the river project were
doubtful and this was known at the time the irrigation benefits were
quantified in Egat's project document.
Benefits-Fishery
About 7% of the project benefits were attributed to fisheries in
Egat's 1988 Project documents. The 1981 Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) predicted that fish production from the reservoir
would increase considerably, though some fish species may be affected
by the blockage of river flows by the dam. The fish yield expected
from the 60 square km Pak Moon reservoir was 100 kg/ha/year without
fish stocking and 220 kg/ha/year with the fish-stocking programme.
However, run of the river reservoirs cannot sustain such high yields,
as they do not provide the appropriate habitat for pelagic fish
species. In Thailand, even storage reservoirs that perform better
under fish stocking programmes have a fish yield of about 19 to 38
kg/ha/year. The predicted fish yield from the dam head pond was too
high. A more realistic estimate would have been around 10 kg/ha/year.
There has been no evidence to indicate that the fish productivity of
Pak Moon reservoir has reached anywhere near the anticipated 100
kilogrammes per year.
After completion of Pak Mun, the lower Moon River experienced a
decline in fishing yields with an estimated value of US$1.4 million
per annum. In addition to this decline in fish species upstream led
to the closure of 70 Tum Pla Yon traps. The value of the annual catch
from these traps is calculated at US$212,000.
IMPACTS
The 1982-83 Environmental Planning Survey predicted 241 households
would be displaced by the project. The actual number of households
displaced by Pak Moon was 1,700. Unpredicted by the EIA, a large
number of households were adversely affected due to declining fishing
yields. Until March 2000, 6,202 households were compensated for loss
in fisheries during the three year construction period. Compensation
for the permanent loss of fisheries has not been given.
UnEXPECTED IMPACTS
Impact on Fish Migration & Fish diversity
Of the 265 fish species recorded in the Moon-Chi watershed before
1994, 77 species are migratory and 35 species are dependent on rapids
for their habitat. The latest survey after the construction of the
dam recorded only 96 species in the upstream region.
Downstream of the Pak Moon project, one or two species of fish have
completely disappeared from the catch after dam construction. The
decline has been higher in the upstream region, where out of the 149
species recognised in the present catch 51 species have been caught
less significantly since the completion of the project. Out of the 51
species the dam has particularly impacted 17 species. As their
migration route is blocked in the beginning of the rainy season, the
head pond has inundated their spawning ground and the fish pass is
not performing. Fish catch directly upstream of the dam has declined
by 60-80% after the completion of the project.
Reservoir Stocking as MitigationReservoir fishery was developed by
EGAT in response to claims of declining fish catch. Total cost of
stocking the head pond with fresh water Prawn (Macrobrachium
Rosenbergi) ranged between US$31,920 and US$44,240 annually between
1995-98. The department of Fisheries estimates the total annual
revenue of fishing yield to range between 1.2 to 3.2 million baht.
However, the estimated annual catch and revenue for fishermen are too
high. The Department of Fisheries in their revenue estimate included
the naturally occurring Macrobrachium species that can breed in fresh
water. The M. Rosenbergi spawns in salt water and migrates to fresh
water and therefore cannot establish a population under reservoir
conditions. For this reason, it may well turn out that the stocking
of M. Rosenbergi in Pak Moon head pond is not generating any income
for the fishermen.
Impact on Livelihood
In the post-dam period fishing communities located upstream and
downstream of the dam reported 50-100% decline in fish catch and the
disappearance of many fish species. The number of households
dependent on fisheries in the upstream region declined from 95.6% to
66.7%. Since the completion of the project several committees were
set up to assess the number and extent of households affected by loss
of fisheries income. Based on the committee's findings, Egat paid
90,000 baht to each of the 3,955 fishermen in 1995, and it approved
payment of 60,000 baht each to another 2,200 fishermen in March 2000.
A large number of households located upstream of the dam are still
waiting to be recognised for compensation. Unexpected costs of the
project included compensation for fisheries (488.5 million baht had
been paid up to March 2000) and investment in fish and prawn stocking
programmes. Till March 2000, 488.5 million baht (US$19.5 million) had
been paid as compensation for loss of fisheries livelihood.
While the government acknowledged the impact on fisheries and agreed
to compensate eligible households at the rate of 90,000 baht for loss
of income during the three-year construction period, mitigation for
the long-term loss of fisheries livelihood is under negotiation.
Impact on RapidsMore than 50 natural rapids were permanently
submerged by the project. These rapids served as the habitat of a
number of species of fish. The implication of the loss of rapids for
fisheries was not assessed in the project's environmental impact
study.
Other Environmental impacts
The project has resulted in the loss of riverbank vegetation, natural
forest and community forest. The women in the community harvested 40
edible plants, 10 bamboo species and 45 mushroom species for
household subsistence and small income. A number of medicinal plants
were also found near the Moon riverbank. Loss of these plants and
vegetation through inundation has implications for biodiversity and
household food security.
These aspects were overlooked in the environment assessment study for
the project.
WHO GAINED, WHO LOST?
The Pak Moon project was a part of Egat's least cost development plan
to serve the peaking needs of Northeast Thailand. However, as the
project cannot function as a reliable peaking plant due to a number
of constraints, the nature and extent of gain from the power
contribution of the remains a matter of speculation. From the
distribution by power producing types in overall generation since
1988, it is apparent that hydropower is gradually playing a less
important role in power provision. When it is most needed, during the
hottest and driest months, they are least likely to have the water
resources to contribute.
Communities dependent on fisheries for their livelihood upstream and
downstream of the Moon River experienced an ongoing decline in fish
catch for which the government has already paid a considerable amount
of compensation. But while compensation settlement has been reached
with a large number of households for loss in income during the three
years of construction, compensation for permanent loss of livelihood
are still under negotiation. Furthermore, permanent loss of fisheries
cannot be replaced by a one-off cash compensation and the Thai
Government is left vulnerable to ever-increasing claims.
Regarding the issue of fisheries, all stakeholders stand to lose, not
only from a disrupted ecosystem but also from increased expenditure
and unsuccessful mitigation efforts.
The projected prosperity after the dam completion has never
materialised. Villagers who owned land on slightly higher elevations
are able to grow rice as prior to the dam construction. But villagers
who were dependent largely on fisheries for cash income have found no
viable alternative means of living. Along the Moon River, swamps and
wetland forests are parts of the riverine ecosystem. During the rainy
season, these are flooding areas and places for fish to spawn. In the
past, villagers used the area along the river to find bamboo shoots,
mushrooms, native plants and vegetables that they depend on for their
subsistence. During the dry season, they also developed narrow
patches of land along the riverbanks for growing vegetables. In the
upper part of the lower Moon, where banks were not steep, land along
the river was developed as paddy fields. All this is now gone.
As their food and income security has been destabilised, villagers
have sought different ways to cope with the changing conditions. Some
have left their villages to look for alternative employment.
Compensation was not invested in productive assets. Many affected
people used the money to build a new house. Many sold their cattle in
order to have cash in hand. Many also have debts after borrowing from
their cooperatives and local moneylenders.
In other words, short term wage opportunities and one off cash
compensation cannot replace the loss of a productive resource base
for the community.
SOCIAL COLLAPSE
After resettlement, villagers have witnessed many social and cultural
problems. The new social arrangements have disrupted former social
relations and changed patterns of interaction among the villagers.
Before the dam the Mun river served as the stage for their social
life.
Villagers met, interacted, developed social networks of exchange, and
helped each other. After the dam, the traditional communal ceremony
usually organised on the riverbank could not be held due to the
submergence of the ceremonial site and, in part, due to the social
disintegration of the communities.
Since the beginning of the Pak Moon project conflicts of ideas and
interest arose between those who opposed the dam and the kamnan and
headmen group.
The conflict was intensified during protests and demonstrations for
compensation. Those who opposed the dam were often discriminated
against so that the conflict over the dam created deep social rifts.
The local community and adversely affected villagers have expended
considerable time and effort over nearly ten years in protests,
demonstrations and negotiations with the government and project
authorities. What became an issue of lost livelihood and a wrangle
over compensation was initially a demand for a say in the decision
making process as it affects their livelihoods. Given the lack of a
satisfactory outcome from their point of view, the process has
created tremendous bitterness.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe from this list, send a message to majordomo@netvista.net
with no subject and the following text in the body of the message
"unsubscribe irn-mekong".
----- End of forwarded message from owner-irn-mekong@netvista.net -----