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Re: Blind signatures; archives?
At 11:40 AM 6/24/96 -0400, Carl Ellison wrote:
>At 07:53 AM 6/24/96 -0700, Hal wrote:
>>The recent proposals for credentials, such as Carl Ellison's and SDSI,
>>don't lend themselves to this. The meaning of the signature is embedded
>>in the signed material. If that material is blinded, the signer can't
>>know what claims are being made in the material that is signed.
>>
>>For blinding to work (as far as I can see) the signature key itself
>>must determine the meaning of the signature.
>
>If I understand you, you want a signature on a blinded key to become a
>certificate the issuer didn't know he made and you want all the content of
>that certificate (not just "meaning", now called <auth> in the Internet
>Draft I'm working on, but also validity dates, etc.) to be provided in the
>signature key itself.
>
>There is that possibility. See the signatures on lissa@world.std.com in the
>PGP key database. However, I think we need to go back to the drawing board
>and find a way for just the signature key to be blinded while the other
>content isn't. Meanwhile, I believe there is a huge need for non-blinded
>certs and believe we can't wait for the results of that effort.
Would it be possible to have a valid SPKI cert which consists of just a
<key> and a <signature>? In other words, the <auth> field would be empty.
I can see all kinds of problems with how you represent an empty <auth>
field so blinding would still work, and I agree with you about the time
frame.
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