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Re: Thoughts on the draft



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In message <3.0b11.32.19960903140442.0053fbc8@cybercash.com>, Carl Ellison writ
es:
>In general, if you have ((Certificate-data)(Sig 1)(Sig 2)(Sig 3)...(Sig n)),
>does the interpretation of the cert depend on the other signatures at all?
>If so, I believe we're in PolicyMaker domain.  If not, then it looks like a
>space-saving abbreviation.
>
I would tend to think signatures are independent; even if we mandate
that you have to have K out of N, this is a policy/implementation
issue, since each signature will individually verify.
Otherwise we'd have to use partial signatures, where the algorithm
actually requires K out of N valid signatures to verify the whole
signature.
I guess this looks a lot like the MAY-DELEGATE situation, where it's
not enforcable by technology (maths/algorithms).
- -Angelos


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