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Re: Private Key replacement


>>>>> "Francesco" == Francesco Zambon <zambon@enidata.it> writes:
    Francesco>  Possibly SPKI is the right place where one can take
    Francesco> some precaution.

    Francesco> I found interesting the proposal included in SET (see
    Francesco> "Secure Electtronic Transaction Specification - Book 1
    Francesco> Business specification '3.3):

    Francesco> When one issues the public/private keys he will
    Francesco> generate also a "recovery key" (private and public
    Francesco> keys).

    Francesco> The recovery key can be kept in a safe "place" (a
    Francesco> floppy in the strongsafe), since they are not actually
    Francesco> in use.

  This is easily done in SPKI right now.
  I do this with PGP (but not that successfully).

  Generate a "personal CA" key. Make sure that all "permissions" (aka
capabilities) that you get are given to your "personal CA" key.
  When you generate your "personal CA" key, you also generate your
"daily use key" and you sign it, with the personal CA key, delegating
(tag (*)) to it.
  Your "personal CA" key goes somewhere safe, your "daily use key" is
protected to your best ability. If/when it gets compromised or lost,
you dig up your "personal CA" key and generate a new daily use key.

]   IETF #40.  Big Bill lives in Washington. D.C. or Seattle?   |  SSH IPsec  [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works, Ottawa, ON    |international[
] mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ |strong crypto[
] panic("Just another NetBSD/notebook using, kernel hacking, security guy");  [

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