[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: single <auth> per cert (was Re: "auth" --> "tag" ?? )
At 03:14 PM 4/2/97 +0200, Bryce wrote:
>> This would imply that there is no way for an automated process to
>> perform the chain collapse unless it was armed with some understanding
>> of the meaning of the auth tags, sufficient to identify what it meant
>> to intersect them.
>
>
>I think this is correct Hal, and I think that this is the "way it
>has to be". If I publish a cert asserting that you have my
>permission to do X, and then you publish a cert asserting that Carl
>has _your_ permission to do X, then the question of whether Carl has
>_my_ permission to do X is dependent on what you and I mean by "X",
>and specifically what you and I mean by intersecting two
>"X"-permissions.
This can work the other way around, which is what I believe we will end
up with. That is, we can specify the intersection rules (as Ron has
tried with his (*) forms), and given that knowledge let you and Hal decide
if you mean the same thing by "X" before you grant X to Hal.
This eventually works back to the ultimate issuer: the verifier of
the cert, who defines for himself what he means by X and accepts issuers
of X who agree with him (by making certs or ACL entries for them to
delegate X).
- Carl
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl M. Ellison cme@cybercash.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
|CyberCash, Inc. http://www.cybercash.com/ |
|207 Grindall Street PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 |
|Baltimore MD 21230-4103 T:(410) 727-4288 F:(410)727-4293 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
References: