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Re: Summary Trust x Delegation

On Fri, May 30, 1997 at 12:45:06PM +0200, Bryce wrote:
> > Users need to be motivated not to give away their secret keys, or
> > restricted not so as not to be able to do so.  If the public key
> > serves multiple authorization functions, that may be sufficient to
> > deter disclosure.  Tamper-proof hardware can keep most users from
> > giving away their keys.  Or, in some applications, one might only
> > certify "bonded" keys.  (I use the key to sign a statement saying that
> > anyone (or at least the first one) in possession of the corresponding
> > secret key can claim $1000 from my checking account.)
> These are three good ideas about ways to discourage people from 
> sharing their private keys, but I think they merely serve to 
> underscore Bill Frantz's point: that there is no way to 
> _generally_, _securely_, _cryptographically_ prevent delegation, 
> and thus we should avoid giving the appearance of being able to do
> so.

It's merely a truth in advertising question, though.  The 
functionality of being able to create a reduced access new cert is 
useful.  That's why I think the bit should be renamed to something 
that just expresses that function.

Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55