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Re: Summary Trust x Delegation
On Fri, May 30, 1997 at 12:45:06PM +0200, Bryce wrote:
>
> > Users need to be motivated not to give away their secret keys, or
> > restricted not so as not to be able to do so. If the public key
> > serves multiple authorization functions, that may be sufficient to
> > deter disclosure. Tamper-proof hardware can keep most users from
> > giving away their keys. Or, in some applications, one might only
> > certify "bonded" keys. (I use the key to sign a statement saying that
> > anyone (or at least the first one) in possession of the corresponding
> > secret key can claim $1000 from my checking account.)
>
>
> These are three good ideas about ways to discourage people from
> sharing their private keys, but I think they merely serve to
> underscore Bill Frantz's point: that there is no way to
> _generally_, _securely_, _cryptographically_ prevent delegation,
> and thus we should avoid giving the appearance of being able to do
> so.
It's merely a truth in advertising question, though. The
functionality of being able to create a reduced access new cert is
useful. That's why I think the bit should be renamed to something
that just expresses that function.
--
Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html
References: