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Re: Revocation, etc...
Ron Rivest wrote:
> I have written a paper of potential interest to the SPKI/SDSI group,
> which is posted on my web site. See
> where the first paper listed is entitled,
> "Can we eliminate revocation lists?"
> The approach proposed there extends the SPKI/SDSI model in two directions:
> -- explicitly describing how key compromise can be handled
> -- giving certificates THREE dates:
> -- an issue date (i.e. the "not-before" date)
> -- an "good-until" date (the certificate is guaranteed by
> the issuer to be good from the issuer until
> the "good-until" date; it can't be revoked
> until after then. No on-line checks would be
> needed until after this date.)
> -- an expiration date (i.e. the "not-after" date)
> This divides the life of a certificate into periods:
> definitely good (no need to check)
> probably good (and checkable)
> Standard SDSI (without on-line checks) has
> good-until = expiration (no checking)
> Standard X.509 has
> good-until = issue (always checking)
> The new proposal gets the benefits of both models, more clearly...
Is the idea that once the "good-until" date has been passed, and you do
the check, that you get a new "good-until" date?
Ben Laurie |Phone: +44 (181) 735 0686| Apache Group member
Freelance Consultant |Fax: +44 (181) 735 0689|http://www.apache.org
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A.L. Digital Ltd, |Apache-SSL author http://www.apache-ssl.org/
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