Re: public key algorithm naming

["Angelos D. Keromytis" <angelos@dsl.cis.upenn.edu>]

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To: Hal Finney <hal@rain.org>
Subject: Re: public key algorithm naming 
cc: spki@c2.net
Date: 03/12/98, 16:00:29


In message <199803121849.KAA08196@s20.term1.sb.rain.org>, Hal Finney writes:
>If you don't put the hash algorithm in the key, then if there were a
>weak hash algorithm, people could forge signatures using that hash.
>They could take an existing signature and create a structure which hashes
>to the same value using the weak hash.

And how is that different from putting the hash algorithm name in the
signature ? Which is where it belongs anyway, since that's where the
algorithm is used ?
- -Angelos

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Follow-Ups:

• Re: public key algorithm naming
• From: fredette@theory.lcs.mit.edu (Matt Fredette)

References:

• Re: public key algorithm naming
• From: Hal Finney <hal@rain.org>

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