[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: reserving some SAIDs
>To my mind, any complete IP security proposal must make it possible to
>send an isolated datagram without end to end set up. This sort of
>thing is the only way I can see to achieve that.
I'm sympathetic, but I'm concerned that this sort of facility is
inherently susceptible to active sabotage. Although verifying an RSA
signature is much faster than generating one, I suspect I can generate
random "signed" packets with random IP source addresses much faster
than you can execute your RSA "verify" routine.
If I lob these at your machine long enough, eventually you'll give up
and "go clear" just to get some useful work done -- which is precisely
the idea of the attack.
Active sabotage may be relatively rare now, but just wait until we
plug up the "easy" holes like sniffer attacks. The potential may not
be unique to the Internet, but I think it's a safe bet that it'll
happen here first. That's why we really need to be sensitive to it in
our designs. I've seen very little of it in other security standards,
which is one reason we need our own.
Phil
References: