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Re: New entry in privacy/wiretap debate

To: "Chris M. Lonvick" <clonvick@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: New entry in privacy/wiretap debate
From: "C. Harald Koch" <chk@utcc.utoronto.ca>
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 1998 15:57:12 -0400
cc: ho@earth.hpc.org (Hilarie Orman), ipsec@tis.com, ekaufman@cisco.com
In-reply-to: clonvick's message of "Mon, 13 Jul 1998 12:07:47 -0400". <3.0.32.19980713110739.009589a0@localhost>
References: <3.0.32.19980713110739.009589a0@localhost>
Sender: owner-ipsec@ex.tis.com

In message <3.0.32.19980713110739.009589a0@localhost>, "Chris M. Lonvick" writes:
> Hello Hilarie,
> 

> There is no key recovery in the "operator action" model. Basically, we and
> others are arguing that most (probably all) IPsec devices already provide a
> customer with the ability to comply with a legal warrant without any
> modification at all. Responding to a lawful warrant is, for many classes of
> product, a management issue not a cryptographic one.

Specifically, plaintext recovery at *one* end of the connection is all that is
required (last time I tried :-) for some exports of strong cryptography.

-- 
Harald Koch <chk@utcc.utoronto.ca>

References:

Re: New entry in privacy/wiretap debate

From: "Chris M. Lonvick" <clonvick@cisco.com>

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