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Re: Fw: IPSec vs. SSL

It seems to me that many of the stated evils of SSL described in the 
Security portal article by Kurt Seifried would reside in IPSEC as well, if 
the roles had been reversed.

It's obvious that one would be able to forge a server certificate in either 
world, given the state of the browser certificate infrastructure. There's 
the risk that someone might insert a bogus CA key in your browser. There's 
the risk that someone will subvert the API to a CA already in the browser, 
and yield a cert for an existing site. And, of course, there's the real 
risk that the attacker will simply submit a new cert that doesn't match 
*any* of your CAs, and you'll accept it so you can order Johnny's Beanie 
Babie Star Wars Lego Mindstorms Cabbage Patch Furby in time for holiday 

If we were using IPSEC instead of SSL for ordering our holiday gifts, then 
we'd have to have the same sort of flexibility in IPSEC implementations. 
That flexibility evolved due to demands of the SSL community, both servers 
and clients. So the problems would most likely have found their way into 
IPSEC implementations, if they were as mature and widespread as SSL, and 
being used for the same applications.

Remember, it's impossible to build a theft-proof car. Some folks will 
always leave the car unlocked, or leave their keys in the ignition, or 
forget to remove their distributor cap before leaving, etc.


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