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RE: Simplifying IKE
> That's incorrect; "traffic analysis" is an idiom with a
> specific meaning
> in the cryptography world.
Alas, it is no longer possible to speak plain English in this technocratic
world :-)
> If the encryption scheme is vulnerable to chosen-plaintext
> attacks, it is
> already too weak to be used for protecting important data.
> Well-chosen
> encryption schemes are not vulnerable to (practical) chosen-plaintext
> attacks, and so this argument falls apart in real life.
I don't disagree with this. If you remember, this topic arose from a
previous discussion in which I was questioning the importance of having
separate SAs (i.e. keys) to protect different flows.
I merely mentioned what I felt to be the best counter-argument in order to
balance out the discussion somewhat. I agree with Scott that this attack is
certainly feasible in many environments, but we think/hope that modern
ciphers are strong enough to resist adaptive chosen plaintext attacks.
Andrew
-------------------------------------------
Upon closer inspection, I saw that the line
dividing black from white was in fact a shade
of grey. As I drew nearer still, the grey area
grew larger. And then I was enlightened.
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