Re: IPsec and RSVP

[Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>]

Derek Atkins writes:
 > "Hannes Tschofenig" <Hannes.Tschofenig@mchp.siemens.de> writes:
 > 
 > > hi
 > > 
 > > what speaks against applying ipsec hop-by-hop (whereby a hop is a rsvp
 > > capable router)?
 > 
 > You lose the authentication of the end-point requesting the
 > reservation.  If you use ipsec in this way, then each router
 > knows its peer, but you have no transitive authentication.
 > The only protection you get is protection of on-the-wire
 > request.  You have no protection against a corrupt router
 > along the path, or indeed no way to know what the actual
 > original request was.

Derek,

There are two different forms of crypto needed for
RSVP: a hop-by-hop integrity object and a policy
object. IPsec could in theory replace the
integrity object, but cannot replace the policy
object. Considering that there is no key
distribution for the hop-by-hop integrity objects,
IPsec might not be a bad choice in some
situations.

		   Mike