Re: identity-misbinding attack on SLA

[Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca>]

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>>>>> "Hugo" == Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il> writes:
    Hugo> This assumption holds in some scenarios but certainly not in all remote user
    Hugo> authentication cases. In many instances the client machine will not have the
    Hugo> server's certificate but will rather have to receive the cert from the
    Hugo> server itself (this cert is verified at the client on the basis of some 
    Hugo> verification PK and policy settings installed at the client).

  I dispute the claim that the public key of the server is not know to the
client. I would further dispute that this will be deployed along with a PKI
that would permit the client to even verify the server.

  Yes, in the general case it might be true, but I don't want to promote
legacy authentication for cross-enterprise use. Single-enterprise
only. Places big enough to have too many people to handle raw RSA keys
manually, yet not big enough to justify a PKI deployment. Those are the
places that "legacy" authentication will be used.
  
  The only situation where I could imagine not knowing the right *server*
certificate in a single enterprise situation is when there is some kind of
failover situation, or anycast-reachable gateway. I don't think either is in
scope.

  I won't speak on the validity of the attack described - just your assumptions.

]       ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine.           |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [
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