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Question regarding user identity confidentiality

hi all, 

i have read the ikev2 tuturial and ikev2 and i have a question about the
user identity confidentiality: 

before secure legacy authentication was added to ikev2 i agreed with the
selected user id confidentiality approach where the identity of the
initiator is revealed first. at that time it is was difficult to assume a
client-server architecture (i.e. which entity starts ike) and therefore
which entity has to be protected. 

for remote access solutions using secure legacy authentication (by using
eap) things are a little bit different. 

with eap you have the following message flow (taken from section 3.16 of

    Initiator                          Responder
      -----------                        -----------
       HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni         -->

                                  <--    HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]

       HDR, SK {IDi, [CERTREQ,] [IDr,]
                SAi2, TSi, TSr}   -->

                                  <--    HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
                                                EAP }

       HDR, SK {EAP, [AUTH] }     -->

The draft says "By including an IDi payload but not an AUTH payload, the
initiator has declared an identity but has not proven it." (message 3)

Section 3.16 additionally says: "Note that since IKE passes an indication of
initiator identity in message 3 of the protocol, EAP based prompts for
Identity SHOULD NOT be used." 

To me this seems that protection of the user identity against an active
attack cannot be provided for eap methods (except if tunneled methods are
used). this seems to have some disadvantages for remote access solutions
where you have a client-server relationship. 

possible solutions are: 

a) ignore user id conf. 
b) suggest to use a tunneled method within ikev2/eap when user identity
confidentiality is required. this clearly has a performance disadvantage
since you create two tunnels (for server to client authentication) in
addition to the eap method for client to server authentication. 
c) change the handling for secure legacy auth. and let the responder
authenticate to the initiator first
d) others? 

am i wrong with my observations?