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Re: [Ipsec] Some (hopefully final) comments to thedraft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-15.txt



Tero:

The IKEv2 document is on the IESG Telechat agenda for this coming 
Thursday.  I put it there because at least one of the ADs has not told us 
whether the update resolved their DISCUSS comments.  I am forcing the 
issue.  If another version is needed to resolve this comment, then the 
changes can be made at the same time.  Otherwise, I think a RFC Editor not 
is appropriate,

Russ

Tero Kivinen wrote:
>I just finished reading the draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-15.txt completely
>again. I found some small points, which probably can either be left as
>they are or fixed during the authors 48 hours notice...
>
>Perhaps the area directors can confirm whether we can fix those in
>last edit phase, if not, then I think we can just leave the changes
>out (the only real issue is the issue number 3 below, as it will
>affect interoperability).
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>1) Section 3.6 Certificate Payload refers X.509 certificates and CLRs
>    as a BER encoded x.509 certificate / CRL. I think it should use DER
>    instead of BER. Of course DER is a subset of BER, so all DER
>    encoded objects are also BER encoded, but not other way around, and
>    the certificates etc must always DER encoding, as it must be same
>    regardless who encoded it.
>
>    I have seen some LDAP servers who took DER encoded certificate, and
>    re-encoded it using BER when sending it out, and that of course
>    caused the signatures to fail etc.
>
>so change
>
>       X.509 Certificate - Signature (4) contains a BER encoded X.509
>       certificate whose public key is used to validate the sender's AUTH
>       payload.
>
>       Certificate Revocation List (7) contains a BER encoded X.509
>       certificate revocation list.
>
>to
>
>       X.509 Certificate - Signature (4) contains a DER encoded X.509
>       certificate whose public key is used to validate the sender's AUTH
>       payload.
>
>       Certificate Revocation List (7) contains a DER encoded X.509
>       certificate revocation list.
>
>
>and
>
>       Hash and URL encodings (12-13) allow IKE messages to remain short
>       by replacing long data structures with a 20 octet SHA-1 hash of
>       the replaced value followed by a variable length URL that resolves
>       to the BER encoded data structure itself. ...
>
>to
>
>       Hash and URL encodings (12-13) allow IKE messages to remain short
>       by replacing long data structures with a 20 octet SHA-1 hash of
>       the replaced value followed by a variable length URL that resolves
>       to the DER encoded data structure itself. ...
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>2) Section 3.7 Certificate Request Payload refers still in one place
>    to CA name instead of the hash of the CA public key.
>
>so change
>
>    means. Thus the processing of a CERTREQ CA name should be seen as a
>    suggestion for a certificate to select, not a mandated one. If no
>    certificates exist then the CERTREQ is ignored. This is not an error
>
>to
>
>    means. Thus the processing of a CERTREQ should be seen as a
>    suggestion for a certificate to select, not a mandated one. If no
>    certificates exist then the CERTREQ is ignored. This is not an error
>
>There is also extra " at the end of that paragraph, which can be
>removed at the same time...
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>3) Section 3.15.1 Configuration Attributes has a table listing which
>    of the attributes are multivalued and which are not. The
>    INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET and INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET are listed in the table
>    as NO (i.e. not multivalued), but the describing text later says
>    "The responder MAY respond with zero or more sub-network
>    attributes.", which indicates that they should be multivalued.
>
>    As it do make sense to send multiple subnets, I think the text is
>    correct and the table is incorrect.
>
>so change:
>
>          INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET     13    NO    0 or 8 octets
>          SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES    14    NO    Multiple of 2
>          INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET     15    NO    17 octets
>
>to
>
>          INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET     13    YES   0 or 8 octets
>          SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES    14    NO    Multiple of 2
>          INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET     15    YES   17 octets
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>4) RFC2401bis reference should have the draft name, as it would make
>    rfc-editors life easier when finding the correct reference, and
>    fixing it to match the rfc number.
>
>so change:
>
>    [RFC2401bis] Kent, S. and Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture
>               for the Internet Protocol", un-issued Internet
>               Draft, work in progress.
>
>to
>
>    [RFC2401bis] Kent, S. and Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture
>               for the Internet Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-
>               rfc2401bis-02.txt, April 2004, work in progress.


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