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dam-l SA water article/LS
The following is from the South African online newspaper, The Star.
November 24, 1998
River dry, mountain high
Water water everywhere but not a drop to drink, said
the Ancient Mariner.
We can drink what's in southern Africa but it is
nowhere near enough to cater
for our needs, even agricultural, let alone
industrial. And as rivers know no
borders, there is every chance of conflict over this
precious commodity,
writes Jo-Ansie van Wyk
Water issues pose three challenges to policy makers
in the region - those of water shortage
and availability, water supply and water quality, the
maintenance of which remains an issue.
Rapid population growth, cross border migration and
urbanisation also pose threats. The facts
of the matter are:
Southern Africa's water inventory is characterised by
several contradictions. South Africa is
home to one third of the region's population. While
South Africa accounts for 80% of
Southern Africa's water use, only 10% of the total
water resource is available in South Africa.
The overall picture that defines the region's water
profile is that of scarcity. At least three of
the region's states (Botswana, Namibia and South
Africa) are short of water.
Resource geopolitics in Southern Africa has long been
neglected. However, water is now
recognised as a fundamental political weapon in the
region. Despite the "peace dividend" in
the region water will increasingly shape
international relations and security arrangements of
the region.
The relative wealth in Southern Africa is
concentrated in the water- poor south of the region.
Poverty is worst in the water- poor north of the region.
A river knows no boundaries. What happens at its
source will reverberate through its course
until it reaches the ocean. Almost none of Southern
Africa's major rivers is contained within
the borders of a single state.
Three aspects of water shape its role in potential
for causing international conflicts. Water is
the most likely renewable resource to generate
conflict. No society can survive without
adequate water supplies. Water is required for the
operation of any economy, even an agrarian
one. It is usually associated with a particular
territory over which states may fight for control.
Also, water resources tend to be unevenly
distributed. These aspects underpin profitable trade
in water while simultaneously contributing to the
politicisation of water. A state like Lesotho
is poor in natural resources, but income derived from
water trade earns the country valuable
foreign exchange. It is also not insignificant that
Lesotho heads the Water Sector in SADC.
Despite this, there is no unanimity of what water is
really worth, since it is a migrant
commodity with a variable value. A common theme runs
through conflicts over water - they
are produced in fixed locations but traded to distant
places.
In the case of Botswana, for example, 94% of fresh
water originates outside its border,
contributing to the vulnerability of the state.
Worldwide, water resources are under threat. Water
issues in the region are some of the most
important, but also some of the most neglected
security issues in the region. Current
predictions of the region's water profile in the next
millennium present a picture of absolute
scarcity. The subcontinent of Africa is vulnerable to
endemic droughts as a result of the El
Ni-o/Southern Oscillation phenomenon that causes dry
conditions in the region. The effects
of El Ni-o on water resources on the region remain
uncertain, and governments are
responding with drought contingency plans with World
Bank assistance in some cases.
Southern Africa as a hydro political security complex
Members of the Southern Africa
Development Community form a security complex. A
regional security complex is a group of
states whose primary security concerns link together
sufficiently closely that their national
securities cannot realistically be considered apart
from one another. The hydro-political
security complex includes all those states that are
geographically partly 'owners' and 'users'
of the rivers in the region and consequently regards
the rivers as a major national security
issue.
The concept of a hydro-political security complex
contributes to an analysis of how water
scarcity is affecting the security situation in
Southern Africa and what underlying potential
conflicts can be identified. The joint dependency on
rivers in the region indicates that the
national security of all states is linked. Therefore,
the security perception must be based on the
region as a level of analysis. This notion challenges
the traditional definition of national
security.
In this way, Southern Africa composes a
hydro-political security complex. Various
sub-complexes are identified. These include, amongst
others, the Zambezi hydro-political
security complex, the Okavango and the Orange River
hydro-political security complex.
Recent events in southern Africa highlight the
potential for conflict in this regard. Conflicts
over natural resources and environmental degradation
have dogged southern Africa for
decades and are likely to intensify since there are
few agreed mechanisms for their equitable
resolution.
Water diplomacy in Southern Africa as a constructive
resolution of disputes If individual
countries in the region are to realise the benefits
of water diplomacy with respect to shared
river basins, this will contribute to regional
development as envisaged in SADC's protocol. It
is also imperative that measures are taken and
mechanisms put in place to strengthen existing
links in the water sector. lnternational water law is
organised around four main doctrines.
These doctrines attempt to delineate the rights of
riparian (river basin) states to utilise water
from an international river course. Having evolved at
different times reflecting developments
in international water law and responding to claims
by riparian states, these doctrines reflect
different historical and juridical approaches to
riparian problems. What is clear, is that despite
these doctrines, international law as an instrument
of regulation on transboundary freshwater
issues is at present inconclusive and weak. The
absence of formal political agreements
contributes to this problem.
However, a widely accepted set of guidelines for
international water rights is to be found in
the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of
International Rivers, adopted at the 52nd
Conference of the International Law Association in
Helsinki in 1966. Despite criticisms
against these rules, the guidelines concentrate
mainly on the water rights and obligations of
states. An important principle of the Helsinki Rules
is that each nation is entitled, within its
own territory, to a 'reasonable and equitable share'
in the beneficial uses of water of an
international drainage basin. However, there are no
comprehensive guidelines in international
law on the non-navigational use of international
rivers beyond the principles of 'equitable
utilisation' and sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedas
(states must not permit the use of their
territory to cause injury to other states) as
enshrined in the Helsinki Rules.
Since 1974 the UN's International Law Commission was
unable to establish any binding
framework. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are
still the only means of establishing
rights. These agreements are often insufficient to
facilitate the management of conflict.
The Law Commission has, however progressed in
application from the initial concept of an
international river, to that of an international
drainage basin and currently to that of an
international watercourse system.
Extensive co-operation exists between southern
African states regarding specific river basins.
These include, amongst others, river basin
commissions relating to the Orange, the Limpopo
and the Okavango, a series of Joint Permanent
Technical Committees, the LHWP and the
ZACPLAN. However, full regional co-operation and
co-ordination remains lacking.
A significant development in this regard was the
signing of SADC's protocol on Shared
Watercourse Systems on 28 August 1995. The object of
the protocol is to develop close
co-operation for judicious and co-ordinated
utilisation of the shared watercourse systems in
SADC. This protocol was formulated under the
Environment and Land Management Sector
co-ordinating unit of SADC (SADC-ELMS).
The Water Protocol includes rights and
responsibilities. One of these responsibilities is that
states within a particular river basin must
co-operate with other states on issues regarding the
river. In addition, it calls for states to establish
institutions on three levels. At the level of
government via Joint Permanent Technical Committees,
signatories should agree on the
sustainable sharing and development of common
resources. At the level of the river basin a
commission should be established. On the third level,
there should be co-operation through
river authorities, board and utilities. The Protocol
also provides for the establishment for a
regional monitoring unit based at the Water Sector.
Mozambique and Zambia have not signed the Water
Protocol. The protocol has not been
implemented by all its signatories. Future
implementation of this protocol is likely to impact
on the water future of the region. However, a number
of obstacles remain.
Schemes such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project
provide temporary relief from water
stress and at best buy time by transferring water
from one drainage basin to another. In this
way, however, they limit the development
possibilities in the donor basins and donor states.
They could also contribute to environmental
degradation by affecting the ecology of the river
basins receiving water. Efforts to ensure survival
could take on the form of 'water
imperialism', that is transferring water from river
basins from states not even neighbouring on
the water-stressed state.
One of the most important obstacles in achieving
water security is to overcome the
institutional weakness of SADC as an organisation.
This is illustrated by the International
Court of Justice (lCJ) case between Namibia and
Botswana. The case has gone to the ICJ
because SADC as an institution could not resolve the
conflict despite the provisions contained
in the SADC Water Protocol for the settlement of disputes.
In addition, states' sovereignty may feel threatened
by stronger regional integration in this
regard. A further threat is a general lack of
awareness in the region about the true value of
water in monetary terms. Northern water-rich states
may use this to their advantage. Interstate
linkages are threatened by different water rights and
legislation within states. Lastly, large
scale linkages could contribute to other
environmental security issues. Water transfer from
one state to another could seriously impact on
downstream states. Another threat involves the
total lack of long term planning in current
arrangements such as the Water Protocol. This is
hampered by the lack of reliable data in this regard.
There has been a proliferation of proposals for
tackling water scarcity issues in Southern
Africa. Towards the end of this millennium,
developments relating to water management were
characterised by the return of the state to regaining
control over water resources, as opposed
to individual ownership, so as to effectively manage
water resources in the public interest. An
illustration in this regard is the fact that water in
Israel is managed by their Ministry of
Defence. Similarly, South Africa is currently
undergoing a water revolution under Kader
Asmal's leadership (the South African Minister of
Water Affairs and Forestry).
The impact of such projects is that donor states
stand to lose water to the recipient states. In
addition, major water transfers require substantial
'water diplomacy' via international
negotiation and agreement.
So far, they have been limited to bilateral
agreements such as the LHWP. Other efforts at
water diplomacy in Southern Africa could include
establishing river authorities for each river,
including all states in the basin, establishing an
early warning system on water issues,
enforcing the Water Protocol and implementing the
Cape Town Declaration, signed in
December 1997 by African Ministers in charge of water
resources. Despite the imbalance
between water availability and usage, as well as the
potential conflict areas associated with it
among states in southern Africa, it cannot be
considered the principle casus belli in the region.
It could be a contributing factor in regional
instability as some states are richer in water
resources than others are. However, South Africa and
her SADC partners are faced, as a
security complex, with one of the greatest challenges
in the region. The long-term solution
might be the revival of the SADC Water Sector, the
creation of commissions and regulating
authorities. The problem might be addressed on a
smaller scale, ie on a basin or watercourse
wide level.
The absence of water issues on the agenda of the
Interstate Defence and Security Committee
(ISDSC) could be addressed. South Africa's leadership
in the region places a double
responsibility on the country often accused of acting
as a de facto upstream state in its water
diplomacy. As the current chair of SADC as well as in
its leadership of the Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security South AFrica has the opportunity
to reverse this perception.
- Jo-Ansie van Wyk lectures International Politics
and Strategic Studies at the University of
South Africa. This contribution draws partly on the
author's research for the New South
African Security Policy Fellowship, 1995. Also see JK
van Wyk, SA moet voortou neem
om water in streek te bewaar, Die Burger, 10
September 1996 and Towards water security
in Southern Africa, Africa Security Review, vol 7 no9
2, 1998. This article is reprinted
courtesy of Accord, in whose publication Conflict
Trends it first appeared
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Lori Pottinger, Director, Southern Africa Program,
and Editor, World Rivers Review
International Rivers Network
1847 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, California 94703, USA
Tel. (510) 848 1155 Fax (510) 848 1008
http://www.irn.org
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