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non-repudiation vs. revocation
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At 09:01 AM 11/3/97 -0500, David P. Kemp wrote:
>The "invalidity date" in an X.509 CRL entry is an advisory indication
>of, for example, the point at which a user believes his key was
>compromised. But allowing both 1) invalidity dates arbitrarily
>far in the past, and 2) invalidity dates unconditionally revoking the
>binding, would result in certification semantics useless for commerce.
>
>Generally speaking, (B) is correct. Revoking a certificate cannot be
>used to repudiate a non-repudiable transaction. But an invalidity date
>in a CRL entry can be useful as a warning flag when processing
>requested but not-yet-committed transactions.
It is not clear at all to me that non-repudiation is possible, given the
state of consumer OS and H/W development (and the Radar O'Reilly attack).
If we give up non-repudiation as a nice academic concept but unworkable in
the real world, then I see nothing wrong with allowing invalidity statements
to tell the truth as you know it -- no matter how far back the revocation
goes.
- Carl
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|Carl M. Ellison cme@cybercash.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
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