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Re: Summary Trust x Delegation

> Users need to be motivated not to give away their secret keys, or
> restricted not so as not to be able to do so.  If the public key
> serves multiple authorization functions, that may be sufficient to
> deter disclosure.  Tamper-proof hardware can keep most users from
> giving away their keys.  Or, in some applications, one might only
> certify "bonded" keys.  (I use the key to sign a statement saying that
> anyone (or at least the first one) in possession of the corresponding
> secret key can claim $1000 from my checking account.)

These are three good ideas about ways to discourage people from 
sharing their private keys, but I think they merely serve to 
underscore Bill Frantz's point: that there is no way to 
_generally_, _securely_, _cryptographically_ prevent delegation, 
and thus we should avoid giving the appearance of being able to do



Disclaimers follow:  I am not a crook.  NOT speaking for DigiCash 
or any other person or organization.  No PGP sig follows.

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