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Re: IPsec and RTP crypto
> i don't think it a "poor fit" in mobile-ip6 case.
Here's a more specific concern:
The use of ipsec for protecting piggybacked binding updates interferes
with safe use of ipsec opportunistic encryption.
A service may set up a listening tcp port with a policy which says
"allow cleartext, or AH-protected, but once encryption is used,
require it on all subsequent packets".
Now, it receives an AH-protected TCP SYN with a binding update
attached (which seems to be a highly likely combination).
Is the receiver to interpret the use of ipsec for that packet as:
a) an indication that all other traffic on this connection will be
protected with AH?
b) a signal that just the segment with the binding update is protected
and to expect cleartext on other packets?
The conservative thing to do is to assume (a), and prevent the
connection from being assassinated by forged unauthenticated RST's.
- Bill
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