Re: IKEv2 SA rekeying - naming an initial SA

[Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>]

On Tue, Aug 19, 2003 at 08:25:23PM -0700, Nicolas Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 19, 2003 at 04:31:36PM -0400, Stephen Kent wrote:
> > IPsec has no anonymous mode, because access control is an essential 
> > feature of IPsec, unlike SSL.  So, no arguments based on the latter 
> > paragraph of your message are likely to be appropriate in this 
> > context.
> 
> One would never want to use anonymous IPsec with any application *other*
> than applications which bind authentication at higher layers to IPsec
> SAs.
...

I'd also like to point out that if we allow non-kg EAPs then we might as
well allow anonymous IKEv2 :) :)

And if we allow IKEv2 w/ non-kg EAPs (with loud warnings) because we
think that others will implement the same regardless of whether it is a
MUST NOT, then we ought to allow anon IKEv2 for the same reason (and
also with loud warnings).

And note that anon IPsec with GSS-API CCM channel bindings to the same
is quite strong[*], compared to IPsec w/ non-kg EAPs.  The former is not
subject to MITMs or spoofing, the latter is.

[*]  As strong as the authentication and integrity protection services
     of the underlying GSS-API mechanism.

Cheers,

Nico
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