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dam-l When Push Comes to Shove on the Biobío
World Rivers Review, Volume 13, Number 4/August 1998, published by
International Rivers Network
>When Push Comes to Shove on the Biobío
>
>by Aleta Brown
>
>A David and Goliath struggle is playing out in the upper reaches of Chile's
>Biobío River. Members of the small but determined indigenous Pehuenche
>population are standing up to the huge utility, Endesa, which is building
>dams in their communities.
>On July 30, 100 Pehuenche people and their supporters attempted to
block
>construction on the US$500 million Ralco Dam in the upper Biobío. Entering
>from a side road, the protesters formed a human chain to block trucks that
>were trying to work on the 10-km-long road to the dam site. The protest
>heated up when 35 local police officers, including a riot squad, tried to
>disperse the crowd with tear gas. The protesters threw the canisters back.
>In the end, four people were arrested and charged with public disorder,
>including Cristian Opaso of the Grupo de Acción por el Biobío (GABB), and
>Augustin Correa, a Pehuenche active in the struggle.
>The unrest at the dam site forced Endesa and government officials
to agree
>to meet with affected people on August 12. As a result of the meeting,
>Planning Minister German Quintana ordered Endesa to stop further work at
>the construction site until the dispute can be resolved. Despite this, 30
>Pehuenche protestors continue to guard the bridge leading to the dam site.
>Conadi, the governmental agency responsible for protecting Chile's
>indigenous population, had earlier petitioned Endesa to suspend all work in
>the area, but Endesa refused and construction continued. According to
>Chile's 1993 Indigenous Law, Endesa cannot begin construction without
>written consent from the 400 Pehuenches who would be resettled to fill the
>dam's 13-square-mile (3,400 ha) reservoir. The law states that indigenous
>land cannot be sold, only traded, and that 100 percent of all families
>involved must agree to the move. The upper Biobío was formally declared an
>indigenous area in March, 1997.
>As with many development projects, the community is divided over
the issue.
>There are those who support the project, believing it will improve their
>situation, while others remain steadfastly opposed. Nine families have said
>they will never trade their land for any price. Nicolasa Quintremán, whose
>family has owned and lived on the same land for 500 years, says, "The only
>way I'll leave here is dead."
>Although Endesa has managed to obtain written consent from at
least half of
>the families, many of these are reportedly trying to contest their
>contracts. According to Christian Science Monitor (May 21, 1998), Endesa
>told the families that they would receive compensation such as animals and
>farm equipment, but the families have yet to see such items. CONADI has
>been looking into the alleged discrepancies of the barter contracts. Also,
>according to a United Press International (UPI) story, an internal report
>by Conadi confirms that some of the families may have been coerced by
>Endesa into signing the contracts. The UPI story alleges that Endesa told
>the families that, because the company had already received all needed
>permits, they had no choice but to sign. A Pehuenche man who signed told
>Conadi representatives, "We don't have any alternative. They are going to
>flood our land and we are not fish."
>
>Political Power Play
>On the eve of a critical Conadi vote concerning Ralco Dam, President
>Eduardo Frei fired Domingo Namuncura, the head of the Conadi. The vote
>concerned the legality of land swap contracts which Endesa had negotiated
>with the Peheunche. Namuncura concluded that the contracts had been
>unfairly negotiated and that the land offered the Pehuenche would not
>sustain their culture and lifestyle. His vote, when added to that of the
>eight indigenous people on the Conadi council, would have torpedoed the
>project.
>In his resignation letter to President Frei, Namuncura wrote, "Conadi's
>review of the land swap contracts, in strict accordance with the Indigenous
>Law and our own regulations, found that the contracts could not be approved
>because they did not comply with a series of requirements regarding their
>conception and execution. The Indigenous Law demands respect for indigenous
>culture Š Indigenous lands are to be protected so that they are used
>appropriately and so that ecological balances are maintained. There is no
>doubt that the Ralco Dam project will have a tremendous impact on the
>indigenous people living there Š This is why the procedures used by Endesa
>in relation to Pehuenche families and communities merit Conadi's utmost
>scrutiny, and have been shown to be lacking with respect to the property
>offered as compensation and with respect to mitigation of social and
>cultural factors."
>President Frei - a staunch supporter of the project and a hydraulic
>engineer - could not have expected the rally of support for the Pehuenches
>that followed. Marching from Santiago to Valparaiso, 70 Mapuches (Chile's
>largest indigenous group) insisted that the country's Human Rights
>Commission travel to the Upper Biobío and assess the situation. The
>Communist Party of Chile has also pledged its support. Hugo Inostroza, the
>Communist Party Secretary, says that the Ralco Dam will cause the "cultural
>ethnocide" of the Pehuenche. In all, the six dams planned for the Biobío
>River would force the relocation of 1,000 Pehuenches, a full 20 percent of
>the survivors of this ancient culture. Endesa has announced that they will
>start full construction of Ralco in early 1999.
>This is not the first struggle for land rights faced by the
Pehuenche. The
>Pehuenches are descendants of the mounted warriors who held back Spanish
>conquest for 200 years. According to anthropologist Theodore Downing, the
>Pehuenche people held 54 million hectares in the last century but their
>land has now been reduced to seven reservations with a total of 30,000
>hectares. The river and the land are interwoven into their spiritual and
>cultural beliefs, and though most adult Pehuenche are considered
>illiterate, they read and understand the language of the river, the Piñon
>pines, and the river valley that has been at the core of their spiritual
>and physical home for centuries.
>The Indigenous Law and the determination of some Pehuenches are not
>Endesa's only obstacles. A lawsuit against Endesa has been filed at the
>Sixth Civil Court in Santiago. The plaintiffs claim that the Environmental
>Impact Assessment (EIA) for Ralco should be declared null and void because
>the procedure for implementing the EIA did not comply with established
>guidelines. The lawsuit against Endesa is also supported by three members
>of the Parliament.
>Chances are, Endesa won't give up the fight easily. The company and its
>shareholders have much to gain from this project . A representative of
>Endesa told GABB that, "We have until the year 2002 [the year the reservoir
>would fill] to solve the issue of the lands of the Pehuenche."
>The hydro-development of the Biobío River began with the 450-MW
Pangue Dam.
>Built and operated by Pangue S.A., the Pangue Dam was financed with the
>help of a US$150 million loan from the International Finance Corporation,
>the World Bank's private sector arm. The IFC's and Endesa's poor handling
>of the project's social issues prompted two investigations which revealed
>human rights abuses associated with the project. One investigations were
>done by the Committee for Human Rights of the American Anthropological
>Association and the International Federation of Human Rights. Both reports
>were highly critical of IFC and Endesa.
>Aside from displacing 600 people, the 570-MW Ralco Dam and its
reservoir
>will threaten at least 50 species of mammal and aquatic life dependent on
>the river; increase access to logging; subject 1,400 hectares of denuded
>reservoir banks to erosion and landslides; decrease downstream flow during
>low water periods and seriously impact downstream aquatic life and
>irrigation practices.
>Chile's intermittent drought is also a cause of concern. With
precipitation
>levels at 50 percent below average this year, reservoirs in the south -
>where much of Chile's hydropower comes from - are only half full. From 1988
>through 1990, Chile experienced a severe drought which forced Endesa to
>purchase outside electricity to satisfy supply contracts. In its 1996
>economic prospectus, Endesa states, "There can be no assurance that a
>period of severe and sustained drought will not adversely affect the
>Company's results of operations."
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Aleta Brown
Campaign Associate
International Rivers Network
1847 Berkeley Way
Berkeley, CA 94703 USA
Phone: 1.510.848.1155
Fax: 1.510.848.1008
email: aleta@irn.org
http://www.irn.org