[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: SPKI mailing list and BOF at Los Angeles
Perry, I admit to some ambivalence in joining this discussion. On the one hand,
I am greatly concerned that an attempt to open a "second front" in a public key
infrastructure will be divisive, contentious, and confusing to potential
vendors and end-users alike. On the other hand, if there are legitimate issues
that people feel cannot be adequately addressed by the existing X.509
certificates, I'd like to understand them and fix them.
>I will say from the outset, however, that I doubt, starting from
>scratch, we would have ended up with X.509; the reason being that
>things like distinguished names and ASN.1 would not likely be things
>the internet community would adopt. However, that said, I'm very much
>interested in hearing the contributions of people with experience in
>the X.509 world and in hearing from those who advocate producing an
>X.509-like system with a much simpler encoding and a more IETFish
>naming structure. It may be argued that X.509 is the global standard
>and that the world doesn't need two standards, but then again, the
>IETF has a habit of trying to stick to technical merits and not
I'm never quite sure who the "we" is, or exactly who the "internet community"
is. but I'm not sure that I would agree with you. You seem to feel that X.509
was somehow foisted upon the Internet by some external forces, but that simply
In 1987, nine years and three companies ago, while I was still with CSC, I
built one of the first, if not the first, secure e-mail programs to use public
key cryptography. It was called STAMP -- Secure, Tamper-proof, Authenticated
Mail Program. The work was motivated by the recognition that existing key
management doctrine (based on symmetric keys, e.g., X9.17) wasn't going to cut
it in a very large network composed of sometimes cooperating and sometimes
mutually suspicious user domains. It used 384 bit RSA keys and single DES, and
by today's standards its cryptographic strength would be considered pitiful.
It didn't use X.509 certificates -- I don't know that they had even been
invented then, but certainly I hadn't heard of them. But it did support a
hierarchy of digitally signed "authorizations" that looked a lot like a
certificate. It even supported cross-linked hierarchies, because one of the
common modes of operation for us at CSC was to team with another company for
one proposal, but compete against them on some other bid. It seems funny that
we are just now coming around to those kinds of concepts in X.509 V3. And even
back then, I was very concerned about trying to put this infant technology on a
sound legal footing, so that it would be used for electronic commerce, as well
as for privacy of communications. so we had digital signatures for
authentication, an Affidavit of Legal mark that was intended to address the
issue of whether a digitally signed document was legally binding, etc.
I'm just saying all this in the spirit of "been there, done that."
In retrospect, that early prototype suffered from several problems that
probably would have been fatal flaws had we tried to develop it into a product.
(This was an IR& D project, and at that time CSC didn't develop or market
First of all, we didn't pay adequate attention to trying to ensure that the
person who was represented in the certificate was uniquely identified. I don't
recall the details any more, but I seem to remember that we had a name, a
company affiliation, and a street address -- pretty common stuff based on a
snail mail view of the world, primarily.
Second, although I knew better, we didn't have any kind of object-oriented
design or strong typing of the different kinds of attributes. They were all
just hard-coded in a structure, so only the compiled code could know which
fields meant what. Even during the development and debugging that began to be a
nuisance, for it was difficult to make revisions in the structure without
impacting everything else -- and we only had three or four people working on
And third, I didn't put much thought into how to actually distrubte the
"certificates". If I had, I would have been more concerned about question of
indexing, what kid of data was going to be included in the index, and how
people would browse he directory to find someone's certificate if they didn't
already have it.
Gee, isn't that funny -- those seem to be precisely the issues that we are
still facing, even in this new forum!
You may or may not like the geopolitical naming scheme that is often cited as
an example of a distinguished name in X.500, but I would contend that if you
want to communicate securely with someone and you don't have the luxury of
having that person physically hand you a disk with his public keys on it, then
you had better be pretty sure that he is who you think he is, and not one of
the other 23,000 William Smiths in the US. Likewise, if you are going to honor
or trust his digital signature for anything important, you would want to know
exactly who that person is as well.
So if you want really good privacy, and trustworthy digital signatures, you
have to solve the problem of uniquely naming/identifying an individual in a
manner that is repeatable. I don't care what you do -- you can use a person's
postal address, or a world-wide telephone number, or a has of their birth
certificate, but you have to come up with something that is globaly
unambiguous. And once you do, you have just created a distinguished name. All
that's left to argue about is the schema that is used, and how easy
(user-friendly) it is to browse a directory or database containing such
The issue of strong typing and identification of attribute fields isn't
something that comes naturally to a lot of programmers who are either still in
school or just out of school, primarily becasue they haven't had enough
experience working with very large systems that must be supported and
maintained over a very long time, by many hundreds and sometimes thousands of
people. When you are only writing code for your own personal use, using some
kind of an attribute-value notation seesm lke a lot of needless effort at the
time. But experience shows that sooner or later, the investment in the
infrastructure will pay off down the line.
A lot of people don't like ASN.1. It isn't terribly easy to read, there aren't
a lot of high quality compilers lying around that are free (like a lot of other
things in life), and some of the purists would argue that like a lot of
standards, the people that designed it didn't know when to quit. OK, let's
stipulate that. So what's your next choice -- COBOL? Certainly a lot of the
"Internet -way" standards seem to have been written by people who afraid to
ever represent anything in binary -- they'd rather parse a bastardized, more or
less human readable string. The point is that even if you admit to the faults
that people criticize ASN.1 for, it's still better than any other even
reasonably popular metalanguage. There are free compilers available (and worth
every penny you pay for them), and there are also commercial-quality compilers
that are excellent. And if you don't like either of those choices you can view
it as a specification language and develop your product using hand-coded
assembler language. (Reminds me of the "Real men don't use compilers" argument
of 20 years ago. And 30 years ago it was "Real men don't use assemblers, they
write it all out in octal, and punch it into paper tape.")
So if this group is just going to go on an anti-ASN.1 kick, count me out. We
are too close to having a real concensus emerge on an X.509-base public key
infrastructure to spend all of the time and effort debating that point again.
We went through it all back in the PEM days -- look in the archives. Even if
you can't stand the thought of ASN.1, introducing a completely different
encoding scheme would have to have almost overwhelming advantages to make it
worth the bother of having two different and incompatible kinds of certificates
formats at this point in time.
Likewise, if people want to argue that there really isn't any purpose in havng
some form of globally unambiguous naming information, whether based on e-mail
addresses, geopolitical/organizations hierarchies, or a number tatootted on you
at birth, I can't help you much, for such systems would simply not be
sufficiently reliable in a global village environment to be very useful.
I suspect that the biggest beef that most people have with X.509 is that they
don't like what they perceive to be the constraints placed on them by the
Distinguished Name. And I will assert that 90% or more of that argument is
based on a misunderstanding of what a DN really is, and how much freedom there
is to create alternative DN structures.
So if people have problems that they feel can't be accommodated by the existing
X.509 structure, I'm more than willing to listen, because I believe that those
problem are more imaginary than real. Of course you may not be able to find a
Certification Authority that will go along with you view of the world, but you
could always set up your own CA and see how many people beat a path to your
>Beyond the X.509 model, I will point out that there are advocates of
>radically different models present, who don't like the underlying
>principles on which X.509 is based (like binding identities instead of
>roles). I want to hear from them, from people who would advocate that
>we simply adopt the mechanisms in the DNS security work, and from all
>other points of view.
I don't understand what is meant by "the X.509 model". X.509 isn't a model of
anything -- it's just a certificate. I believe that people confuse X.509 with a
certain view of X.500 (which generally isnt' correct), or even with X.400.
However, if people believe that there are _inherent_ problems with X.509 and
its ability to represent a very wide range of naming and identification
schemes, including role-based schemes, then I would be interested in hearing
that point of view.
Robert R. Jueneman
40 Sylvan Road
Waltham, MA 02254
"The opinions expressed are my own, and may not
reflect the official position of GTE, if any, on this subject."